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Abstract: In this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium model of the regions of Russia to 
assess the impact of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the regions of Russia. We 
estimate that the average gain in welfare as a percentage of consumption for the whole country is 7.8 
percent (or 4.3 percent of consumption); we estimate that three regions will gain considerably more: 
Northwest (11.2 percent), St. Petersburg (10.6 percent) and Far East (9.7 percent). We estimate that the 
Urals will gain only 6.2% of consumption, considerably less than the national average. The principal 
explanation in our central analysis for the differences across regions is the ability of the different regions 
to benefit from a reduction in barriers against foreign direct investment. The three regions with the largest 
welfare gains are clearly the regions with the estimated largest shares of multinational investment. But the 
Urals has attracted relatively little FDI in the service sectors. An additional reason for differences across 
regions is quantified in our sensitivity analysis:  regions may gain more from WTO accession if they can 
succeed in creating a good investment climate.  
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Russia is the largest economy in the world that is not a member of the World Trade Organization. 
Russia applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in June 1993 and 
the GATT Working Party was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) Working Party in 
1995. President Vladimir Putin has made WTO accession a priority for Russia, and after languishing for 
several years, the Russian accession negotiations began to see real progress under his administration.  
In response to numerous calls for a quantitative assessment of the impact of WTO accession on 
Russia, Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (forthcoming) have estimated the economy-wide and sector impacts 
of Russian WTO accession. While this paper has been helpful in identifying the sectors likely to expand 
and contract and the reasons for the gains to Russia from WTO accession, geographically Russia is the 
largest country in the world. There are parts of European Russia close to markets of Western Europe and 
parts of Far Eastern Russia that are close to the markets of China and Japan, while large portions of 
Siberia are relatively isolated. We can expect the impacts across the regions to be very diverse, even for 
the same industry.  Consequently, there is a need for a model of Russia that distinguishes its regions.  
In this paper we develop a ten region model of Russia for the purpose of assessing the impacts 
across these ten regions. The structure of the model for each region follows the general structure of the 
national model of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr. In particular, we allow foreign direct investment in the 
business services sectors in each region. We also allow for imperfect competition where the sectors that 
use goods or services produced under imperfect competition obtain endogenous productivity effects from 
additional varieties of goods or services (the Dixit-Stiglitz framework). 
We present results and explain the economic intuition for these results from a computable general 
equilibrium model that we believe is appropriate to evaluate the regional impacts of Russian accession to 
the WTO. We argue that the gains to Russia from WTO accession will derive from three principal effects, 
which are, in order of importance: 
(1) Liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in services. A growing body of evidence 
and economic theory suggest that the close availability of a diverse set of business services is important   3
for economic growth.
 1 The key idea in the literature is that a diverse set (or higher quality set) of business 
services allows users to purchase a quality adjusted unit of business services at lower cost.  Russian 
commitments to multinational service providers will encourage them to increase foreign direct investment 
to supply the Russian market. Russian businesses will then have improved access to the services of 
multinational service providers in areas like telecommunication, banking, insurance, transportation and 
other business services. This should lower the cost of doing business in Russia, increase productivity of 
Russian firms using these services and generally improve the competitiveness of the Russian economy.  
However, the regions of Russia vary widely in their capacity to attract foreign direct investment. 
Differences in results across regions depend to a significant extent on their attractiveness as a location for 
FDI. 
(2) Russian tariff reduction. Tariff reduction will lead to improved domestic resource allocation since 
tariff reduction induces the country to shift production to sectors where production is valued more highly 
based on world market prices. This impact, known as the “gains from trade” is a fundamental effect from 
trade liberalization and is often stressed by international trade economists in the literature. In addition, 
Russian businesses will be able to more easily import modern technologies or a greater variety of 
technologies and this will increase Russian productivity. As we show, this second impact is more 
important.
2 
(3) Improved access to the markets of non-CIS countries in selected products. Russia has already 
negotiated most-favored nation (MFN) status on a bilateral basis with most of its important trading 
partners, so Russia’s exporters will not see an immediate reduction in the tariffs they face and this effect 
may not be expected to be large. But Russia will have improved rights under antidumping and 
                                                      
1 As early as the 1960s, the urban and regional economics literature (e.g., Jacobs, 1969; Chinitz 1961; Vernon 1960; 
Stanback, 1979) recognized the importance of non-tradable intermediate goods (primarily producer services 
produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale) as an important source of agglomeration externalities 
which account for the formation of cities and industrial complexes, and explanations of the difference in economic 
performance across regions. The more recent economic geography literature (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 
1999) has also focused on the fact that related economic activity is economically concentrated due to agglomeration 
externalities (e.g., computer businesses in Silicon Valley, ceramic tiles in Sassuolo, Italy).  Evidence comes from a 
variety of sources.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that firms operating in economically dense areas are more 
productive than firms operating in relative isolation. Caballero and Lyons (1992) show that productivity increases in 
industries when output of its input supplying industries increases. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the richest 
countries in the world are clustered in relatively small regions of Europe, North America and East Asia, while the 
poor countries are spread around the rest of the world. He argues this is partly explained by transportation costs for 
inputs since it is more expensive to buy specialized inputs in countries that are far away for the countries where a 
large variety of such inputs are located. 
 
2 Romer (1994) has emphasized that the impact of trade liberalization on new or higher quality products is much 
more important quantitatively than improved resource allocation.    4
countervailing duty investigations in its export markets, which is the source of the improved access we 
model.
3 
Our aggregate results for each region are summarized in table 13a. Our central estimates are that 
the overall gains to Russia from WTO accession are 7.8 percent of Russian consumption (or 4.3 percent 
of GDP). While the average gain in welfare as a percent of GDP for the whole country is 4.3 percent, we 
estimate that three regions will gain considerably more: Northwest (6.2 percent), St. Petersburg (5.7 
percent) and Far East (5.2 percent). The principal explanation for the differences across regions is the 
ability of the different regions to benefit from a reduction in barriers against foreign direct investment. 
The four regions with the largest welfare gains are clearly the regions with the estimated largest shares of 
multinational investment. All have estimated multinational shares of the service sector that are twice the 
national average in maritime services, rail services, truck services, air transportation services, 
telecommunications, science and financial services. On the other hand, we estimate that the Urals will 
gain only 3.3% of GDP, considerably less than the national average. But the Urals has relatively little FDI 
in the services sectors. 
  We observe that the reduction in barriers to FDI alone results in an improvement in Russian 
welfare on average across regions of 6.7 percent of consumption (or 3.7 percent of GDP). Improved 
market access and tariff reduction contribute an improvement in Russian welfare by 0.3 percent and 0.7 
percent of consumptioni, respectively, or a combined one percent. Thus, by far the most important effect 
derives from the reduction in barriers to FDI in services. We also simulate a reduction in the barriers to 
FDI in business services of only fifty percent of the cuts we assume in our WTO scenario. The gains in 
Russian welfare are substantially reduced to 4.2 percent of consumption, which again shows the 
importance of reducing barriers to FDI in order to increase Russian productivity, competitiveness and 
welfare. Thus, the estimated gains from FDI liberalization are almost three-quarters of the total gains from 
Russian WTO accession. Thus, while improving its offer to foreign services providers within the context 
of the GATS has been one of the most difficult aspects of Russia’s negotiation for WTO accession, our 
estimates suggest that the most important component of WTO accession for Russia in terms of the welfare 
gains is liberalization of its barriers against FDI in services sectors. 
In the sensitivity analysis, we also incorporate data on the investment potential of regions based 
on the investment potential rankings of Expert RA. The principal result is that the estimated gains for 
Moscow, St. Petersburg and Tumen increase and the estimated gains for Siberia, Northwest, North, 
                                                      
3 WTO accession will grant an “injury determination” to Russia in antidumping cases in WTO members countries. 
Combined with the decision by the US and the EU to treat Russia as a market economy this will imply Russian 
exporters may have considerably improved rights in these cases in the US. But market economy status may be 
denied in particular cases, so it will be necessary to see how this is implemented in practice.    5
Central and the Far East decline. Despite smaller estimated gains in this scenario, Far East and Northwest 
are still estimated to receive above average gains. The results suggest that the gains for a region could 
vary considerably depending on whether it succeeds in creating an atmosphere conducive to investment.   
Our estimates show that many of our Russian goods sectors should expand and employment in 
many services sectors expands. This occurs despite the reduction in all tariffs by 50 percent and a 
reduction in barriers against foreign direct investment in business services. Whether a sector expands or 
contracts depends on what happens to the incentives of one sector versus another. Economy-wide, Russia 
will see an increase in exports equal to the increase in imports. The expansion in exports occurs because 
Russia will have to pay for additional imports through hard currency, which increases the demand for 
hard currency and causes a real depreciation of the ruble. A depreciated ruble makes exporting more 
profitable and decreases the demand for imports until the additional exports are equal to the additional 
imports. The export intensive sectors tend to gain the most from ruble depreciation. 
In goods sectors, we estimate that the ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals and chemicals sectors 
are the goods sectors that expand the most. These are the sectors that export the most intensively. They 
also experience a terms of trade gain from improved treatment in antidumping cases. We estimate that 
food, machinery and equipment and construction materials will decline as these sectors export relatively 
less and are relatively highly protected.  
In business services, employment effects vary across sectors, with some expanding 
(multinationals will demand Russian labor when they locate in Russia and the demand for business 
services increases) and some contracting demand for labor (since multinationals use Russian labor less 
intensively than Russian companies). But users of business services will become more internationally 
competitive as they obtain an increase in the quality and diversity of available competitively priced 
business services. 
This paper quantifies and supports the views expressed by the some in the government that when 
all changes are taken into account, many goods sectors would expand, despite a reduction in their tariff. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the model and the most important 
data. In section III, we describe and interpret the policy scenarios and quantitatively assess the sensitivity 
of the results to parameter assumptions. Many of the scenarios we describe are decomposition scenarios 
that allow us to assess the relative importance of the various aspects that we consider important to 
Russian WTO accession. We provide sensitivity analysis in section IV and briefly conclude in section V. 
   6
II. Overview of the Model and Key Data 
 
Production and Geographic Structure 
There are 30 sectors in the model that are listed in table 1. There are three types of sectors: 
perfectly competitive goods and services, imperfectly competitive goods sectors and imperfectly 
competitive business services sectors.  
The geographic decomposition of our model of Russia is shown in table 2. In the first instance, 
we obtain data from the publication the Regions of Russia by Rosstat on 88 regions of Russia. The 88 
regions have several names in Russian; the most common legal jurisdiction is referred to in Russian as an 
“oblast.” Oblasts are analogous to states in the United States or provinces in Canada. But there are also 
jurisdictions known as territories, federal cities, autonomous districts and an autonomous region. Since we 
want to use the term “region” for another purpose in the model, we use the Russian term “oblast” for all 
of these 88 geographic areas,
4 with the understanding that they are not all oblasts in the Russian sense of 
the term.  
  We group several contiguous oblasts into what we call Regional Markets (RMs). The mapping of 
oblasts into regional markets is also shown at the top of table 2. In this paper, we shall analyze effects at 
the level of the Regional Market. Value-added, exports and imports by sector  for our ten regions of 
Russia are presented in tables 3-11. 
We assume that firms and sectors operate at the Regional Market level, primary factors of 
production are not able to move between Regional Markets (unless otherwise notes).  We assume a nested 
CES structure of demand.  Since this implies that the structure of demand is both a homothetic and 
weakly separable, consumers and firms in a representative Regional Market r employ multiple stage 
budgeting for all goods. 
 
Price determination for competitive goods and services sectors 
Firms in each Regional Market have three choices for sales: sell in their own Regional Market; 
sell to other parts of Russia; or export to the rest of the world. This is depicted in figure 1.  Firms 
maximize revenue for any given output level based on their transformation possibilities between the three 
types of goods which is defined by a constant elasticity of transformation production function. For all 
firms within the same Regional Market, the product they export to other parts of Russia (including other 
oblasts within their own regional market) is homogeneous.  It follows from our assumptions of 
                                                      
4 Several of the territories are part of oblasts, so it was necessary to adjust the data to avoid double counting of the 
territories.    7
homogeneous demand and production outside of the own Regional Market, that for each competitive 
good, say good g, there will be only three prices for good g of Regional Market r: the price of good g in 
Regional Market r; the price of good g from Regional Market r in other parts of Russia; and the price of 
good g from Regional Market r in the rest of the world. 
The structure of demand for goods or services from competitive sectors is shown in figure 2. 
Consumers and firms in a representative Regional Market r first optimize their choice of expenditures on 
foreign goods versus goods from Russia. Subsequently they optimally allocate their expenditures between 
goods from other Russian Regional Markets and their own Regional Market. Finally, they optimally 
allocate their expenditures between goods from the other Russian Regional Markets. This structure 
assumes that consumers differentiate the products of producers from different regional markets; but, they 
regard as homogeneous the products of producers from different oblasts within the same regional market.  
 
Goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale 
The structure of demand for goods produced under increasing returns to scale is shown in figure 
3. Consumers (and firms) in RM r, optimally allocate expenditures on good g among the goods available 
from the different regional markets of Russia and the rest of the world producers. Having decided how 
much to spend on the products from each regional market, consumers then allocate expenditures among 
the producers within each regional market. Since we assume identical elasticity of substitution at all 
levels, this is equivalent to firm level product differentiation of demand. That is, the structure is 
equivalent to a single stage in which consumers decide how much to spend on the output of each firm in 
the first stage of optimal allocation of expenditure.  
We assume that imperfectly competitive manufactured goods may be produced in each region or 
imported. Both Russian and foreign firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is 
constant) equals marginal revenue in each regional market. There is a fixed cost of operating in each 
region and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero for each firm on its sales in each regional 
market in which it sells. Quasi-rents just cover fixed costs in each region in the zero profit equilibrium. 
We assume that all firms that produce from the same regional market have the same cost structure—the 
standard symmetry assumption. 
 Foreigners produce the goods abroad at constant marginal cost but incur a fixed cost of operating 
in each RM in Russia. The cif import price of foreign goods is simply defined by the import price; by the 
zero profits assumption, in equilibrium the import price (less tariffs) must cover fixed and marginal costs 
that foreign firms incur in each regional market.   8
Similar to foreign firms, Russian firms also produce their goods in their home regions; they incur 
a fixed cost of operation if each RM in which they operate. By the zero profit constraint, if they operate in 
a RM, the price of their product must just cover both fixed and marginal costs of operation in that RM. 
 In figure 4, we depict the structure of production for imperfectly competitive Russian firms. 
Regional firms use intermediate inputs (which can be foreign inputs, inputs from other regions of Russia 
or from its own region) and primary factors of production to produce output. We emphasize that business 
services are not part of the “other services” nest; rather business services substitute for primary factors of 
production in a CES nest.
5 We show that the elasticity of substitution between business services and 
primary factors of production significantly impacts the results.  
We assume that Russian firms do not have any market power on world markets and thus act as 
price takers on their exports to world markets. On the exports to the rest of the world then, price equals 
marginal costs.  On sales to Russia, firms must use a specific factor in addition to the other factors of 
production. The existence of the specific factor implies that additional output or firms can only come at 
increasing marginal costs.  Imperfectly competitive Russian goods producers sell in all of Russia; but 
services firms do not sell in other Russian regional markets.  
We employ the standard Chamberlinian large group monopolistic competition assumption within 
a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which results in constant markups over marginal cost. For simplicity we 
assume that the composition of fixed and marginal cost is identical in all firms producing under increasing 
returns to scale (in both goods and services). This assumption in a Dixit-Stiglitz based Chamberlinian 
large-group model assures that output per firm for all firm types remains constant, i.e., the model does not 
produce rationalization gains or losses.  
  An increase in the number of varieties increases the productivity of the use of imperfectly 
competitive goods based on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. Dual to the Dixit-Stiglitz quantity 
aggregator is the Dixit-Stiglitz cost function which shows the productivity adjusted cost of using the 
available varieties in the regional market when varieties are purchased at minimum cost for a given output 
level. This cost function for users of goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale declines in the 
total number of firms in the industry. The lower the elasticity of substitution, the more valuable is an 
additional variety.   
  We have assumed that imperfectly competitive firms within a regional market have symmetric 
cost structures and face symmetric demand for their outputs.  It follows from these assumptions that all 
                                                      
5 For example, firms can employ an accountant or a lawyer, or contract for accounting or legal services. They can 
employ a driver and buy a truck, or contract for delivery services.  These examples make it evident that it is more 
appropriate to allow substitution between business services and primary factors of production than to assume a 
Leontief structure.   9
imperfectly competitive firms from a regional market will obtain the same price in any regional market of 
Russia in which they operate, although the price will differ across regional markets since the fixed costs 
associated with entering any regional market varies across the regional markets.  
 
Services sectors that are produced in Russia under increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition 
These sectors include telecommunications, financial services, most business services and 
transportation services. In services sectors, we observe that some services are provided by foreign service 
providers on a cross border basis analogous to goods providers from abroad. But a large share of business 
services are provided by service providers with a domestic presence, both multinational and Russian.
6 As 
shown in figure 5, our model allows for both types of foreign service provision in these sectors. There are 
cross border services allowed in this sector and they are provided from the firms outside of Russia at 
constant costs—this is analogous to competitive provision of goods from abroad. Cross border services 
from the rest of the world, however, are not good substitutes for service providers who have a presence 
within the regional market of Russia where consumers of these services reside.
7 
Russian firms providing imperfectly competitive business services operate at the regional level 
and organize production in a manner fully analogous to imperfectly competitive Russian firms producing 
goods. Thus, figure 4 applies to both Russian imperfectly competitive goods and services firms. Other 
assumptions we made for imperfectly competitive goods producers, such as entry conditions, pricing and 
symmetry are also apply to imperfectly competitive services providers. The only difference is that we 
assume that regional services providers sell only in their own regional market. It follows from these 
assumptions that there is a unique price for all Russian providers of imperfectly competitive business 
services in a regional market.   
There are also multinational service firm providers that choose to establish a presence in a RM of 
Russia in order to compete with regional Russian firms directly in the Russian Regional Market. The 
decision to locate in a regional market by a multinational must take into account the existence of a fixed 
cost of operating in a regional market. As with imperfectly competitive goods producers, quasi-rents must 
cover the fixed plus marginal costs of producing in a regional market and we have a zero profit 
equilibrium.  
                                                      
6 One estimate puts the world-wide cross-border share of trade in services at 41% and the share of trade in services 
provided by multinational affiliates at 38%. Travel expenditures 20% and compensation to employees working abroad 
1% make up the difference. See Brown and Stern (2001, table 1).  
7 Daniels (1985) found that service providers charge higher prices when the service is provided at a distance.   10
When multinational service providers decide to establish a domestic presence in a regional market 
of Russia, they will import some of their technology or management expertise. That is, foreign direct 
investment generally entails importing specialized foreign inputs. Thus, the cost structure of 
multinationals differs from Russian service providers. Multinationals incur costs related to both imported 
primary inputs and Russian primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor inputs. Foreign provision of 
services differs from foreign provision of goods, since the service providers use Russian primary inputs. 
This is shown in figure 6, where we show multinationals combining imported primary inputs with inputs 
of the service good from the oblasts within the regional market.  Domestic service providers do not import 
the specialized primary factors available to the multinationals. Figure 4 for Russian business service 
providers is analogous to figure 6 for multinational service providers except for the nest for imported 
primary inputs. Foreign service providers also must use a specific factor to produce the output and this 
implies that additional output can only be obtained at increasing marginal costs. Since the structure of 
costs for all multinational firms that provide a service s in a given region m is identical and demand is 
symmetric, there is a unique price for all multinationals providers of service s in regional market m. 
 For multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affect their profitability and 
entry. Reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment in a region will induce foreign entry that 
will typically lead to productivity gains because when more varieties of service providers are available, 
buyers can obtain varieties that more closely fit their demands and needs (the Dixit-Stiglitz variety effect).  
 
Factors of Production 
Primary factors include skilled and unskilled labor and three types of capital; (i) mobile capital 
(within regions); (ii) sector-specific capital in the energy sectors reflecting the exhaustible resource; and 
(iii) sector specific capital in imperfectly competitive sectors. We also have primary inputs imported by 
multinational service providers, reflecting specialized management expertise or technology of the firm. 
The existence of sector specific capital in several sectors implies that there are decreasing returns to scale 
in the use of the mobile factors and supply curves in these sectors slope up.   
The above list of primary factors exist in all regions. In the case of skilled and unskilled labor it is 
natural to assume that the representative agent in the region obtains the returns from these factors of 
production. Consistent with standard trade models, in our central model we assume that capital and labor 
are immobile between regions. However, this model is a regional disaggregation of a national model of 
Russia; consequently, it does not seem reasonable to assume that all capital in a region is owned by the 
agents in that region. Thus, we make the assumption that a fraction of the capital in any region is held by 
agents outside of the region, but the capital is held by residents in the country. We take the fraction of the   11
capital held by agents in the region to be 50 percent, but this percentage is not crucial to the solution of 
the model.  
Regarding the capital of each region that is held outside of the region, it is convenient to think of 
a national mutual fund that holds the remaining capital in each region. For all three capital types ((i) 
mobile; (ii) specific capital in the energy sectors; and (iii) specific capital in the IRTS sectors) fifty 
percent of the capital used in the region is owned by this mutual fund and the balance is owned by the 
representative agent in the region. The national mutual fund invests in all regions and obtains an overall 
return. The representative agent in the region also holds shares in the national mutual fund.
8. 
For each region we report returns to capital as returns to the three types of regional capital held 
by the region’s representative agent. Plus the region’s representative agent obtains a share of the returns 
from the national mutual fund.
 The return to national capital is the region’s share of the return of the 
national mutual fund reported as a percentage of initial consumption of the region.  
 
Key Data 
  Ad Valorem Equivalence of Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Services Sectors 
Among the key restrictions against multinational service providers that have existed or exist in Russia are: 
the Rostelecom monopoly on long distance fixed-line telephone services (scheduled to be removed), 
affiliate branches of foreign banks are prohibited, and there is a quota on the multinational share of the 
insurance market.
 9  Estimates of the ad valorem equivalence of these and other barriers to FDI in services 
are key to the results. Consequently, we commissioned 20 page surveys from Russian research institutes 
that specialize in these sectors and econometric estimates of these barriers based on these surveys.   
                                                      
8  Define M(r) as the representative agent’s share of the returns to the national mutual fund. We calculate M(r) as 
follows.  For each region r, the initial consumption income C( r) equals its endowment income E( r) minus the share 
of the trade surplus B( r) attributed to the region: C( r)  =  E( r) – B( r).  Define B( r) = [C(  r)/C]* B  
where C is aggregate consumption for Russia and B is the aggregate trade surplus. That is, the region’s share of the 
trade surplus is proportional to its share of aggregate consumption. 
 
E( r) is defined above, but is also defined as:  E( r) = L( r) + K( r) + M(r). That is, endowment income for each 
region is labor income L( r); plus capital income on regional capital held by the representative agent in the region K( 
r); plus the representative agent’s share of the returns to the national mutual fund M(r).  E( r), L( r) and K( r) are all 
known. We calculate M( r) residually for each region r as: 
E( r) - L( r) - K( r) =  C( r) - B( r) - L( r) - K( r) =  M(r) . 
 
9 The protocol on Russian accession signed between the European Union and Russia on May 21, 2004 calls for the 
termination of the Rostelekom monopoly by 2007 and allows for an increase in the upper limit on the multinational 
share of the Russian insurance market.   12
These questionnaires provided us with data, descriptions and assessments of the regulatory 
environment in these sectors.
 10  Using this information and interviews with specialist staff in Russia, as 
well as supplementary information, Kimura, Ando and Fujii  (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) then  estimated the 
ad valorem equivalence of barriers to foreign direct investment in several Russian sectors, namely in 
telecommunications; banking, insurance and securities; and maritime and air transportation services. The 
process involved converting the answers and data of the questionnaires into an index of restrictiveness in 
each industry. Kimura et al. then applied methodology explained in the volume by C. Findlay and T. 
Warren (2000), notably papers by  Warren (2000), McGuire and Schulele (2000) and Kang (2000).  For 
each of these service sectors, authors in the Findlay and Warren volume evaluated the regulatory 
environment across many countries. The price of services is then regressed against the regulatory barriers 
to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of services. Kimura et al. then 
assumed that the international regression applies to Russia. Applying that regression and their 
assessments of the regulatory environment in Russia from the questionnaires and other information 
sources, they estimated the ad valorem impact of a reduction in barriers to foreign direct investment in 
these services sectors.
11 The results of the estimates are listed in table 2.
 12  In the case of maritime and air 
transportation services, we assume that the barrier will only be cut by 15 percentage points, since pressure 
from the Working Party in these sectors is not strong.  
Share of Expatriate Labor Employed by Multinational Service providers. The impact of 
liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in business services sectors on the demand for labor 
in these sectors will depend importantly on the share of expatriate labor used by multinational firms. We 
explain in the results section that despite the fact that multinationals use Russian labor less intensively 
than their Russian competitors, if multinationals use mostly Russian labor their expansion is likely to 
increase the demand for Russian labor in these sectors.
13  We obtained estimates of the share of expatriate 
labor or specialized technology that is used by multinational service providers in Russia, but which is not 
                                                      
10   This information was provided by the following Russian companies or research institutes: Central Science 
Institute of Telecommunications Research (ZNIIS) in the case of telecommunications, Expert RA for banking, 
insurance and securities; Central Marine Research and Design Institute (CNIIMF) for maritime transportation 
services and Infomost for air transportation services. We thank Vladimir Klimushin of ZNIIS; Dmitri Grishankov 
and Irina Shuvalova of  ExpertRA; Boris Rybak and Dmitry Manakov of InfoMost; and Tamara Novikova, Juri 
Ivanov and  Vladimir Vasiliev of CNIIMF. The questionnaires are available at www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto. 
The same sources provided the data on share of expatriate labor discussed below. 
11   Warren estimated quantity impacts and then using elasticity estimates was able to obtain price impacts. The 
estimates by Kimura et al. that we employ are for “discriminatory” barriers against foreign direct investment. Kimura 
et al. also estimate the impact of barriers on investment in services that are the sum of discriminatory and non-
discriminatory barriers.  
12   See Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2006) for an explanation of the estimate in telecommunications.  
13 See Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) for a detailed explanation on why FDI may be a partial equilibrium 
substitute for domestic labor but a general equilibrium complement.    13
available to Russian firms, from the Russian research institutes that specialize in these sectors. In general, 
we found that multinational service providers use mostly Russian primary factor inputs and only small 
amounts of expatriate labor or specialized technology. In particular, the estimated share of foreign inputs 
used by multinationals in Russia is: telecommunications, 10% plus or minus 2%; financial services, 3%, 
plus or minus 2%; maritime transportation, 3%, plus or minus 2%; and air transportation, 12.5%, plus or 
minus 2.5%. 
 
Tariff and Export Tax data 
Tariff rates by sector are taken from the paper by Tarr, Shepotylo and Koudoyarov (2006). Tarr, 
Shepotylo and Koudoyarov estimate the tariff rates by sector in our model based on the following data 
and methodology. For the purpose of calculating the tariff rates, we obtained data on the quantity and 
value of imports for 2001, 2002 and 2003 from the electronic database of the commercial company 
Academy-Service.
14 This dataset provides information on the Russian tariff structure at the tariff line 
level, i.e., the 10-digit level. The source of information on tariff rates is the Decree of the Government of 
Russian Federation on import duties #830.
15  The decree is available, for example, at www.consultant.ru. 
  The average MFN tariff in Russia has increased between 2001 and 2003. On an un-weighted 
simple average basis it increased from 11.6% to 12.9%; on a weighted average basis it increased from 
11.4% to 14.5%. This average is calculated based on MFN tariffs. 
Collected tariffs are less than MFN tariffs because of a several exemptions in the Russian tariff 
structure. Most notably, CIS imports usually enter tariff free (although there are exceptions to this rule), 
and personal and private imports also enter tariff free for sufficiently small values of imported shipments. 
 We also provide estimates of the tariff rates where we adjust for zero tariff collections on CIS imports. 
That is, in our formulas for calculating the tariff on a tariff line, we set ad valorem and specific rates on 
imports from the CIS countries equal to zero to take into account the special trade regime within the CIS. 
We call these calculations our estimated collected tariff rates. We find that overall estimated collected 
tariff rates are lower than the MFN rates by about one percent. 
Our overall estimated collected tariff rate was equal to 10.4% in 2001, 10.9% in 2002, and 11.5% 
in 2003. On the other hand, based on Ministry of Finance and Customs Committee data, the actual 
                                                      
14 http://www.ftinform.com 
15 We looked at three editions of the decree: first, dated by 11.30.2001 for 2001; the second, dated by 02.06.2003 for 
2002 rates, and the third, dated by December 2003 for 2003 rates.    14
collected rate was 9.5% in 2001, 9.7% in 2002, and 9.8% in 2003.  The difference can be attributed to the 
fact that we did not take into account any exemptions other than the CIS free trade zone exemption.
16 
We believe collected tariff rates more closely approximate the protection a sector receives and the 
incentives it faces. Using our estimated collected tariff rates, and based on a Rosstat mapping from the 
tariff line data of the Customs Committee to the sectors in our input output table, we calculated a 
weighted average tariff rate for the sectors of our model. The results of this procedure for each sector of 
our model are reported in table 12a.  
  Export tax rates are calculated from the 2001 input-output table of Rosstat and are reported in 
table 12a. Since we do not change export taxes in the counterfactual simulations, these parameters are less 
important to the results than the tariff rates.  
 
Input-output tables 
The core input-output model is the 2001 table produced by Rosstat. The official table contained 
only 22 sectors, and importantly has little service sector disaggregation. In order to disaggregate the table, 
 we used costs and use shares from our 35 sector Russian input-output table for 1995 prepared by expert 
S. P. Baranov. (For details see www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto.) When we broke up a sector such as 
oil and gas into oil, gas and oil processing, we assumed that the cost shares and use shares of the sector 
were the same in 2001 as they were in the 1995 table. For example, steel is an input to the oil and gas 
sector. Suppose in 1995, that oil purchased 55 percent of the steel used in oil and gas. Then we assume 
that in 2001, oil purchased 55 percent of the steel used in oil and gas.  
 
Regional IO tables 
We generated input-output tables for the regions based on output data from the regions and the 
national input-output table. For each industrial sector we took national output from the national input-
output table for 2001, and we used the data in Regions of Russia to allocate the shares of that output 
across regions. That is, from the Regions of Russia 2001, we have, by region; industry shares of output 
for the year 2000 (table 13.3); thousands of tons of oil recovery, including gas condensate, for the year 
2000 (table 13.13); extraction of natural gas (in millions of cubic meters for the year 2000, table 13.14); 
thousands of tons of mined coal for the year 2000 (table 13.15). We also have external exports and 
imports by region, as well as the commodity structure of exports and imports by region for the year 2001 
                                                      
16 To calculate actual collected rate, we used the Ministry of Finance data on collected import duties as a numerator. 
As a denominator, we used the overall import volume less import from Belarus as reported by the Russian Customs 
Committee. The exclusion of the imports from Belarus is determined by the fact that the electronic dataset which we 
used in the calculations reported import volume without imports from Belarus.   15
(tables 23.1 and 23.2). We also have unpublished data supplied by Rosstat on exports and imports by 
sector and by region of Russia. 
We assume that the technology of production is common across regions, so that the same input 
output coefficients apply across all regions.  We create an input output table for each region of Russia, 
where the shares of output and energy for each region are taken from the Regions of Russia and we have 
common technology across all regions.  We infer regional demand (and supply) of services, assuming that 
intermediate and final demand for services have the same intensity of demand in all regions as in the 
national model. 
We have to adjust the resulting regional import and export intensities so that regional exports in 
aggregate are consistent with national import and export values.  We do not need to make any other 
adjustments, as the production technologies are assumed consistent across the regions. 
 
FDI Shares 
We explain the methodology further in the appendix, but briefly, we first employed the NOBUS 
survey to obtain the shares of workers working in multinationals service sectors in each sector in each 
region. We used this as a proxy for the share of output in each service sector in each region. We also 
obtained information from (1) our estimates from Russian service sector institutes of the share by sector 
of multinational ownership in the key services sectors;
 17 (2) Regions of Russia (2003) by Rosstat; and (3) 
the “BEEPS survey.  Only the NOBUS survey provides data that allows us to estimate shares of 
multinational ownership by both region and sector.  We thus start with our calculations based on the 
NOBUS information.  
When found, however, that when we aggregate the NOBUS shares across regions or sectors, the 
other three sources of information show considerably higher foreign ownership shares than the NOBUS 
survey.  We believe that the NOBUS survey estimates are too small, and adjust them. We adjusted our 
estimates from the NOBUS to be consistent with the estimates of the service sectors institutes. The 
service sector institute estimates are lower than those from the BEEPS or Regions of Russia, and thus 
involve less adjustment of the NOBUS data. We employed least squares adjustment of the NOBUS data 
so that the weighted average over all of Russia in each sector is consistent with the national estimates we 
received from the specialist service sector research institutes in Russia. This process will give as a 
structure of ownership based on the NOBUS survey, with the economy-wide average by sector 
determined by the national data. Results are presented in table 12b.  
 
                                                      
17 We thank the service sectors institutes in Russia mentioned above for these estimates.   16
III. Policy Results 
 
For each of our ten regional markets, we first discuss our central scenario (results are in table 13). 
In our central scenario, we assume that tariffs on goods are cut by fifty percent, that barriers to foreign 
direct investment are eliminated or reduced (depending on the sector) and that seven industrial sectors 
receive an improvement in their market access between 0.5% and 1.5%.  See table 12a for details by 
sector. We present the overall welfare effects, the impact on wages and returns to capital, the changes in 
exports and the real exchange rate and factor adjustment costs.  The gains come from a combination of 
effects, so we also estimate the comparative static impacts of the various components to WTO accession 
in order to assess their relative importance. We also decompose the results in the components of the gains 
to provide a transparent explanation of the results.  Next we discuss the estimates of the impact at the 
level of productive sectors of the economy.  In order to obtain an assessment of the adjustment costs, we 
estimate the percentage of mobile labor and capital that must change industries. We also conduct 
sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters and present these results. A key aspect of the 
sensitivity analysis is how the results differ when we assess the ability of different regions to attract FDI 
based on the ranking of their investment potential. The sensitivity analysis helps to provide insights into 
how the gains may differ across regions.  
Welfare Effects of WTO Accession 
  In table 13a, we show that the weighted average of the welfare gains across all regions is 4.3 
percent of GDP or 7.8 percent of consumption. By region, the welfare gains as a percent of GDP range 
from 3.1 percent in Tumen to 6.2 percent in the Northwest region. Except for Tumen, the gains as a 
percent of consumption range from 6.2 percent in the Urals regional market to 11.2 percent in the 
Northwest regional market. The gains to Tumen as a percent of consumption are much higher because a 
larger share of the GDP of Tumen is invested, so consumption is a smaller share of GDP. 
  In order to assess what is causing these results we have undertaken several additional simulations 
in which we allow only one of the components of our WTO scenario to change, while holding others 
constant. That is we evaluate separately the impact of complete removal of barriers to foreign direct 
investment in business services, but no other changes; the impact of an increase in market access alone; 
and a cut tariff barriers only. 
  Explaining Differences across Regions.  While the average gain in welfare as a percent of 
GDP for the whole country is 4.3 percent, we estimate that three regions will gain considerably more: 
Northwest (6.2 percent), St. Petersburg (5.7 percent) and Far East (5.2 percent). The principal explanation 
for the differences across regions is the ability of the different regions to benefit from a reduction in   17
barriers against foreign direct investment. Some regions may attract FDI much more easily than others.  A 
key parameter in our model is the initial share of multinational investment in each sector in each region. 
Multinational firms have widely different shares of the business services sectors in the different regions. 
A ten percent expansion of multinational firms will be a much larger absolute amount in a region that has 
substantial FDI initially. Thus, larger initial shares of FDI in a region will lead to larger absolute increases 
in FDI  in the region when the barriers against FDI are reduced.  
In table 12b, we display our estimates of the shares of the industry captured by multinational 
firms. The three regions with the largest welfare gains are clearly the regions with the estimated largest 
shares of multinational investment (along with a fourth region, the North region, which also gains 
substantially). All have estimated multinational shares of the service sector that are twice the national 
average in maritime services, rail services, truck services, air transportation services, telecommunications, 
science and financial services. On the other hand, we estimate that the Urals will gain only 3.3% of GDP, 
considerably less than the national average. But we see from table 12b that the Urals has relatively little 
FDI in the services sectors, as the Urals share of FDI ranges from about 50 to 70 percent of the national 
average depending on the sector.  
Impact of Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization in Business Services.  In this scenario, 
presented in table 13b, we reduce barriers against FDI in the services sectors according to the cuts in table 
12, but there is no reduction in tariffs or improved market access. Russian commitments to reduce barriers 
against multinational service providers will allow multinationals to obtain greater after tax returns on their 
investments in Russia. This will encourage them to increase foreign direct investment to supply the 
Russian market. Although we expect some decline in the number of purely Russian owned businesses 
serving the services markets, on balance there will be additional service providers. Russian users of 
businesses services will then have improved access to the providers of services in areas like 
telecommunication, banking , insurance, transportation and other business services. We have referenced 
several empirical papers in the introduction which show that availability of a diverse set of service 
suppliers is crucial to the growth of countries as this should lower the cost of doing business and increase 
productivity of Russian firms using these services.  We estimate that the gains to Russia from 
liberalization of barriers to FDI in services are about 6.7 percent of the value of Russian consumption or 
3.7 percent of the value of GDP. 
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Impact of Improved Market Access. In table 13d, we present the results of a scenario in 
which we allow for improved market access (according to the terms of trade improvements of table 12), 
but we do not lower tariffs or barriers to FDI in services sectors. We estimate that the impact of improved 
market access at 0.3 percent of consumption (0.2% of GDP). The gains come from both improved prices 
for exports. But also a higher value for exports allows Russia to buy more imports and more varieties of 
imports increase productivity. The gains are quite small compared with the gains from liberalization of 
barriers against FDI in services. In part this is because the ad valorem equivalent of the barriers against 
FDI are much higher than the percentage improvement in market access, while Russia already has most-
favored-nation (MFN) status or better on a bilateral or plurilateral basis with virtually all its trading 
partners. 
  Improved market access has a small but positive effect on all regions except Tumen. The reason 
the impact is negative for Tumen is that Tumen exports mainly oil and gas, products that do not gain from 
the improved market access. The improved market access results in greater exports for the economy, 
which has the effect of appreciating the real exchange rate, and thereby reducing the value of the principal 
exports of Tumen. This is analogous to the Dutch disease problem, except it is non-oil and gas exports 
that are hurting the oil and gas exports in this scenario. 
Impact of Tariff Reduction. The results for this scenario are presented in table 13e. We lower 
tariffs by fifty percent, but there is no liberalization of the barriers to FDI or improved market access. The 
estimated welfare gains to the economy are 0.7 percent of consumption or 0.4 percent of GDP.  
The gains to the economy from tariff reduction alone come about for two reasons. Tariff 
reduction in Russia will lead to improved domestic resource allocation since tariff reduction will induce 
Russia to shift production to sectors where production is valued more highly based on world market 
prices. This impact, known as the “gains from trade” is the fundamental effect from trade liberalization 
and is often stressed by international trade economists. In addition, Russian businesses will be able to 
more easily import a variety of modern technologies and this will increase Russian productivity. 
 
Summary of Overall Welfare Effects. We observe that the reduction in barriers to FDI 
results in an improvement in Russian welfare on average across regions of 6.7 percent of consumption. 
Improved market access and tariff reduction contribute an improvement in Russian welfare by 0.3 percent 
and 0.7 percent, respectively, or a combined one percent. Thus, by far the most important effect derives 
from the reduction in barriers to FDI. We also simulate a reduction in the barriers to FDI in business   19
services of only fifty percent of the cuts we assume in our WTO scenario (shown in table 13c).  The gains 
in Russian welfare are substantially reduced which again shows the importance of reducing barriers to 
FDI in order to increase Russian productivity and welfare.  
Impact on the Productive Sectors  
It is useful to discuss principles of sector analysis before discussing the results. Businessmen in 
Russia sometimes complain that the tariff or FDI barriers in their sector will decline and forecast that 
WTO accession could adversely impact on their sector. The initial effect of the tariff reduction is to 
induce an increase in the demand for imports, and this is the immediate impact that businessmen fear. But 
the rest of the world will not provide Russia with a “free lunch,” i.e., the increased imports have to be 
paid for by increased exports.  The increased demand for imports raises the prices of foreign exchange 
(more technically, depreciates the real exchange rate) that in turn induces an increase in exports and a 
decrease in the quantity of imports.  The real exchange rate depreciates until the value of the increase in 
exports equals the value of increased imports. The percentage change in the overall value of increased 
international exports is presented in the table 13a and equals 9.4 percent in our central scenario.
18 The 
expansion of exports varies across regions ranging from a low of  2.8 percent from Tumen to a high of 23 
percent from the Central region.
19 
Thus, not all sectors can decline since Russia has to pay for its imports with hard currency. It is 
not the absolute level of the tariff that is important for the impact of WTO accession on the sector; rather 
it is the impact of changes in protection on relative prices. The tariff reduction induces output expansion 
in many sectors because, first, tariff reduction reduces the costs of imported intermediate inputs, so the 
price of intermediate inputs may decline in many sectors.  Second, and crucially, tariff reduction induces 
a depreciation in the real exchange rate. 
Similarly, all regions within Russia must pay for their imports, from abroad or from other regions. 
 Analogous to our national model, we assume that each region has a balance of trade constraint such that 
                                                      
18 The change in the value of international exports must equal the change in the value of international imports. Since 
international exports exceed international imports in the benchmark equilibrium, the percentage change in exports is 
smaller than the percentage change in imports.  
19 Since the initial value of exports exceeds the initial value of imports in our data set, a smaller percentage increase 
in exports is equal in absolute dollar value to a larger percentage increase in imports.   20
any increase or decrease in imports is exactly matched by an increase or decrease in exports. Moreover, 
total employment in the region is unchanged by the trade or FDI policy changes. Thus, an expansion of 
employment in one sector must be offset by a decline in employment in another sector.  
  In tables 15-18, we present the estimated results in particular sectors and region. We present the 
results for the WTO overall scenario.  Our WTO accession scenario involves a proportional reduction in 
all tariffs to one-half of their original level, improved market access and complete removal of barriers to 
FDI in services. Results are presented for output, exports, imports and employment of skilled and 
unskilled labor by sector. We discuss manufacturing and services sectors separately. 
Expanding Manufacturing Sectors.  Results for the manufacturing sectors that expand or 
contract depend on several industry characteristics. Sectors which are likely to expand are those that 
either: export a relatively large share of their output; obtain an exogenous increase in export prices as a 
result of WTO accession; are relatively unprotected initially compared to other sectors of the economy; or 
experience a significant reduction in the cost of their intermediate inputs, typically because they have a 
large share of intermediate inputs that come from sectors that produce additional varieties due to trade or 
FDI liberalization. 
The manufacturing sectors that we estimate are likely to expand their output the most are ferrous 
metals, chemicals and non-ferrous metals.
20 These sectors are among the sectors that we assume will gain 
an exogenous increase in the price of its exports upon WTO accession. They are also among those that 
export the highest share of their output—they all export over thirty percent of the value of their output on 
                                                      
20 In the Saint Petersburg, Northwest, Far East and North regions, we estimate a more substantial expansion 
of the business services sectors than in other regions, since, as explained above, these regions already experience 
more foreign direct investment relative to the other regions of the economy. The expansion of business services in 
these regions attracts labor and capital away from other sectors of the region, which explains why output of non-
ferrous metals declines in the Northwest region (and slightly in the Saint Petersburg region). But non-ferrous metals 
is a rather small sector in those regions so it does not significantly detract from the economy-wide overall expansion 
of non-ferrous metals—which is equal to 61 billion rubles in 2001 rubles.  
 
The estimated decline in the value of non-ferrous metals output in the Northwest and Saint Petersburg 
regions is 100 million rubles for the sum of the decline from the two regions. Since value-added is 308 billion rubles 
in Saint Petersburg and 152 billion in the Northwest region in 2001 rubles, this is only about two-tenths of one 
percent of the value added of the regions. Economy-wide, value-added of non-ferrous metals is 195 billion rubles in 
2001, so these declines are only about one-half of one percent of  the value-added of non-ferrous metals. 
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a national basis. Export intensity is important because a reduction in tariffs generally depreciates the real 
exchange rate (see Table 13 for estimates). Since the real exchange rate depreciates, sectors that export 
intensively will gain an increase in the value of their exports in terms of rubles.
21 
  Declining Manufacturing Sectors. The sectors that contract the most are the sectors that are the 
most protected prior to tariff reduction and which have a relatively small share of exports. Most notably 
this includes food, machinery and equipment and construction materials.  All of these sectors do little 
exporting and are among the sectors with tariff rates above ten percent. Textiles and apparel, with the 
highest tariff in the economy, also declines, but less significantly. But the export and import intensities 
vary across regions, so results differ across regions.  
  Business Services Sectors.  Russian business and labor interests in these sectors are not the same, 
and we discuss the impact on labor in these sectors first. Our central estimates, shown in tables 16 and 17, 
are that skilled and unskilled employment will expand in several business services sectors, most notably 
telecommunications, truck transportation and railway transportation services.  The reason is that as a 
result of a reduction in the barriers to foreign direct investment in these sectors, we estimate that there 
will be an expansion in the number of multinational firms who locate in Russia to provide business 
services from within Russia, and a contraction in the number of purely Russian firms. But multinationals 
also demand Russian labor, even though they use Russian labor slightly less intensively than Russian 
firms.
22 But as more service firms enter the market, the quality adjusted price of services falls, and 
                                                      
21 Formally, there is no money in the model, so the value of exports increases in terms of the numeraire.  The real 
exchange depreciates because the increased demand for imports accompanying the decline in tariffs induces an 
increase in the price of foreign exchange. In addition, the reduction in barriers to multinational investment in the 
services sector depreciates the real exchange rate. This is because multinationals use more foreign skilled labor, and 
they must pay in foreign exchange for the foreign skilled labor from domestic sales. The depreciation of the real 
exchange rate encourages exports and mutes the import expansion. The depreciated real exchange rate results in the 
export sectors having an increased incentive to export even if the tariffs in the export markets are unchanged. This is 
one of the primary reasons that international trade economists say that an import tariff is equivalent to a tax on 
exports. Given our view that Russia will neither give nor receive a free lunch from the rest of the world in the long 
run, we assume that there must be an increase in the value of exports to match the increase in the value of imports 
accompanying tariff reduction. The real exchange rate is the principal variable that induces the equilibrium between 
the change in imports and exports. 
22 As discussed above, we have employed estimates of the share of expatriate labor used by multinationals provided 
by Russian research institutes in the services sectors. In general the share is small, from about 3 to 15 percent, 
depending on the sector. We perform sensitivity analysis, using the high and low estimates provided by the research 
institutes.   22
industries that use services expand their quantity demanded for business services. For 
telecommunications, truck transportation and railway transportation services, on balance, the increase in 
labor demand from the increase in the demand for business services exceeds the decline in labor demand 
from the substitution of multinational supply for Russian supply in the Russian market. Thus, we estimate 
that labor in these business services sectors will gain from an expansion in foreign direct investment and 
multinational provision of services in Russia.  
  These results are not uniform, however, as in maritime and financial services sectors we estimate 
a decline in employment. In these sectors the fact that multinationals use Russian labor less intensively 
dominates the impact of the greater use of business services.  
  Regarding capital, as a result of the removal of restrictions, we estimate there would be 
significant increase in foreign direct investment and an increase in multinational firms operating in 
Russia. Regarding Russian firms, we must be careful in interpreting what this means. As discussed above, 
we define joint ventures between Russian firms and multinationals as a multinational firm. An estimated 
decline in Russian firms does not mean their capital moved to other sectors or disappears. In many cases, 
it means the Russian firms have become joint venture partners with a multinational firm in the same 
sector.  Multinationals will often look for Russian joint venture partners when they want to invest in 
Russia. Many Russian companies providing business services are likely to see this as a profitable 
opportunity and form joint ventures with multinationals. These Russian companies will become part of 
the expanding multinational share of the business services market. The Russian firms that become part of 
joint ventures with foreign investors will likely preserve or increase the value of their investments. 
Russian capital owners in business services who remain wholly independent of multinational firms, either 
because they avoid joint ventures or are not desired as joint venture partners, will likely see the value of 
their investments decline.  
This suggests that domestic lobbying interests within a service sector are very diverse regarding 
FDI liberalization. We estimate that labor should find it in their interest to support FDI liberalization even 
if capital owners in the sector oppose it. But capital owners themselves may have diverse interests 
depending on their prospects for acquisition by multinationals.   23
IV. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity to Investment Potential of the Regions 
In our central scenario, results differ across regions due to a significant extent to the inherited FDI 
of the regions—the more existing FDI, the more the regions are capable of attracting new FDI for the 
same elasticities.  In this scenario we augment the assessment of how regions may adapt and attract FDI 
based on the ranking of their investment potential. For investment potential ranking we use the rankings 
of Expert RA, which we explain in Appendix B. We use the investment potential rankings to adjust a 
parameter in our model (etaf) that reflects the responsiveness (elasticity) of foreign investment supply to 
an increase in the price of their product in the region. We assign higher values of etaf to regions with 
above average investment potential rankings and conversely for low investment potential rankings. We 
present these results in the first row of new results in table 19, where we also indicate how the elasticity 
etaf varies across regions based on the investment rankings.   
The principal result is that the estimated gains for Moscow, St. Petersburg and Tumen increase 
and the estimated gains for Siberia, Northwest, North, Central and the Far East decline. Despite smaller 
estimated gains in this scenario, Far East and Northwest are still estimated to receive above average gains. 
The results suggest that the gains for a region could vary considerably depending on whether it succeeds 
in creating an atmosphere conducive to investment.   
 
Sensitivity to Results to a 50% Cut in the Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment 
We perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the extent of liberalization of barriers to foreign 
direct investment. In this scenario, we cut in the ad valorem tax equivalence of the barriers to FDI in the 
services sectors by 50 percent of the cut we executed in our central scenario.  In this scenario, we allow 
for improved market access and a fifty percent cut in tariff barriers. We find that the gains to the economy 
are reduced to about 4.2 percent of consumption or 2.4 percent of GDP. St. Petersburg and the Northwest 
regions still are the regions that gain the most, but the rainking of gains among other regions changes 
slightly—reflecting different relative gains from FDI, versus tariff reduction or improved market access.     24
Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis 
In table 19, we present the impact on welfare of varying the value of key parameters. In these 
scenarios, we retain the central value of all parameters except the parameter in question. In general, the 
gains to the economy (welfare gains) increase with an increase in elasticities, since higher elasticities 
imply that the economy is able to more easily shift to sectors or products that are cheaper after trade and 
FDI liberalization.
23 There are two parameters in the table that have a strong impact on the results: the 
elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services (esubs) and the elasticity of 
multinational firm supply (etaf). A liberalization of the barriers to FDI will result in a reduction in the cost 
of business services, both from the direct effect of lowering the costs of doing business for multinational 
service providers and from the indirect effect that additional varieties of business services allow users to 
purchase a quality adjusted unit of services at less cost.  When the elasticity of substitution between 
value-added and business services is high (esubs = 2 in table 19), users have the greater potential to 
substitute the cheaper business services and this increases productivity. The elasticity of multinational and 
Russian firm supply (etaf, etad) is primarily dependent on the sector specific factor for each firm type 
(foreign or domestic). When etaf is high, a reduction in the barriers to foreign direct investment results in 
a larger expansion in the number of multinational firms supplying the Russian market, and hence more 
gains from additional varieties of business services.  In addition, the share of the services market captured 





These results are consistent with the themes of empirical work on multilateral trade liberalization 
that suggest that a country will generally gain more from its own liberalization than it gains from 
improved access to the markets of its trading partners. Improved market access is a gain to Russia but is 
quantitatively less important than its own tariff and FDI liberalization in terms of increases in Russian 
                                                      
23 An increase in the elasticity of substitution between varieties reduces the welfare gain. This is because when 
varieties are good substitutes, additional varieties are worth less to firms and consumers.    25
welfare from WTO accession. In addition, we find that in the Russian context, liberalization of barriers to 
FDI are quantitatively more important than tariff liberalization. In part, this reflects the starting point of 
the analysis, in which we assess that Russia has done more to lower it tariffs on goods than it has to 
liberalize its barriers to FDI in services sectors. But it is also explained by the economic geography 
literature that suggests that access to a diverse set of service providers is crucial for growth.  
Regional results in our central scenario differ mainly due to inherited FDI, where more existing 
FDI allows a region to more easily attract new FDI when barriers against FDI are relaxed. In our 
sensitivity analysis, we show that a better investment potential of a region will also lead to larger gains for 
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SCI Science & science servicing
FIN Financial services 
FME Ferrous metallurgy
NFM Non-ferrous metallurgy
CHM Chemical & oil-chemical industry
MWO Mechanical engineering & metal-working
TPP Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry
CNM Construction materials industry
FOO Food industry
OTI Other industries 
HEA Public services, culture and arts
AGR Agriculture & forestry
COL Coalmining




CRU Crude oil extraction
OIL Oil refining and processing
OTH Other goods-producing sectors 
PST Post
TRD Wholesale and retail trade 
CLI Textiles and apparel
3.  Competitive sectors subject to constant returns to scale
1.  Sectors where foreign direct investment from new multinational services providers is 
possible 
2.  Sectors where new foreign firms may provide new goods from abroad
   29
Table 2.  List of Russian Regional Markets and Oblasts










far Far East (agi,chi,hab,amu,sao,pri,eao)
Oblasts (plus Republics, Territories, Federal Cities, Autonomous Regions, Autonomous Districts)
1. ady Adygeya, The Republic of  46. mar Mari El, The Republic of 
2. agi Aginsky Buryatsky Autonomous District 47. mor Mordovia, The Republic of 
3. alt Altaisky krai 48. msk Moscow city
4. alr Altay Republic 49. mos Moskovskaya
5. amu Amurskaya 50. mur Murmanskaya
6. arh Arkhangelskaya 51. nen Nenetsky Autonomous District 
7. ast Astrakhanskaya 52. niz Nizhegorodskaya
8. bas Bashkortostan, The Republic of  53. sev North Osetia, The Republic of 
9. bel Belgorodskaya 54. nov Novgorodskaya
10. bry Bryanskaya 55. nvs Novosibirskaya
11. bur Buryatia, The Republic of  56. oms Omskaya
12. chr Chechnya (sou), The Republic of *
/
57. ore Orenburgskaya
13. chl Chelyabinskaya 58. orl Orlovskaya
14. chi Chitinskaya 59. pen Penzenskaya
15. chu Chukotsky Autonomous District 60. per Permskaya
16. chv Chuvashia, The Republic of  61. pri Primorsky krai
17. dag Dagestan, The Republic of  62. psk Pskovskaya
18. eve Evenkiysky Autonomous District 63. ros Rostovskaya
19. ing Ingushetia, The Republic of  64. rya Ryazanskaya
20. irk Irkutskaya 65. spb Saint Petersburg City
21. iva Ivanovskaya 66. sah Sakha, The Republic of
22. eao Jewish Autonomous Region 67. sao Sakhalinskaya
23. kab Kabardino Balkaria, The Republic of  68. sam Samarskaya
24. klg Kaliningradskaya 69. sar Saratovskaya
25. kal Kaluzhskaya 70. smo Smolenskaya
26. klr Kalymykia, The Republic of  71. sta Stavropolsky krai
27. kam Kamchatskaya 72. sve Sverdlovskaya
28. kar Karachaevo Cherkessia, The Republic of  73. tai Taimyrsky (Dolgano-Nenetsky) Autonomous
29. krl Karelia, The Republic of   District
30. kem Kemerovskaya 74. tam Tambovskaya
31. hab Khabarovsky krai 75. tat Tatarstan, The Republic of 
32. hak Khakasia, The Republic of  76. tom Tomskaya
33. kha Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous District 77. tul Tulskaya
34. kir Kirovskaya 78. tum Tumenskaya
35. kom Komi, The Republic of  79. tve Tverskaya
36. kpa Komi-Permyatsky Autonomous District 80. tyv Tyva, The Republic of 
37. kor Koryaksky Autonomous District 81. udm Udmurtia, The Republic of 
38. kos Kostromskaya 82. ulo Ulyanovskaya
39. kdk Krasnodarsky krai 83. ust Ust-ordynsky Buryatsky Autonomous District
40. kra Krasnoyarsky krai 84. vla Vladimirskaya
41. krg Kurganskaya 85. vlg Volgogradskaya
42. krs Kurskaya 86. vol Vologodskaya
43. len Leningradskaya 87. vor Voronezhskaya
44. lip Lipetskaya 88. yam Yamalo-Nenetsky Autonomous District
45. mag Maganskaya 89. yar Yaroslavskaya
*
/ No data.    30
Table 3.  Value Added in 2000 by Russian Regional Market and by Sector
     (in billions of 2001 rubles) 
a/
Sector 







MAR 4.7        1.3           1.4           7.2           4.1           14.7         4.0           1.7           6.9           1.0          47.1        
AGR 110.2    17.5         7.4           84.8         125.2       155.3       15.2         11.8         8.2           15.1        550.7      
AIR 3.6        1.3           1.0           5.3           4.5           10.0         14.9         1.6           2.5           0.6          45.2        
CHM 13.9      0.3           1.6           10.6         9.3           35.6         7.7           2.0           0.1           4.2          85.4        
CNM 10.3      1.1           0.7           4.6           6.7           12.2         8.8           2.4           0.8           0.7          48.2        
COL 0.1        5.2           3.2           32.6         1.7           1.2           43.9        
CON 76.4      7.1           6.1           54.7         105.2       151.6       138.6       29.7         24.1         11.4        605.0      
CRU 4.5           16.9         9.9           37.7         97.5         282.9       1.0          450.3      
ELE 26.7      7.8           7.1           34.7         22.9         62.9         42.9         10.5         19.1         5.8          240.4      
FIN 43.5      16.4         14.3         60.7         44.0         106.8       115.7       20.8         47.0         9.0          478.0      
FME 19.0      0.5           1.6           9.0           3.9           33.8         2.3           1.1           11.3        82.5        
FOO 24.9      9.2           3.7           17.4         24.0         28.1         33.9         17.7         0.5           4.7          164.2      
GAS 0.2           0.4           0.5           1.5           2.8           52.2         0.0          57.5        
HEA 42.3      17.5         14.6         58.8         45.0         100.6       126.3       21.8         40.6         8.9          476.4      
HOU 22.1      8.8           6.7           29.1         24.8         50.9         68.0         11.2         13.7         4.6          239.8      
MWO 38.7      11.2         2.6           19.4         18.0         101.8       45.4         18.9         3.0           3.6          262.7      
NFM 2.5        8.1           9.3           113.2       4.8           46.0         7.1           4.4           0.2          195.5      
OIL 12.2      4.7           1.5           17.4         10.1         39.2         4.4           7.2           3.9           100.6      
OTH 7.7        2.0           2.2           8.8           4.9           18.4         6.3           3.3           7.4           1.9          62.8        
OTI 13.6      0.6           0.7           2.5           4.0           9.2           9.9           2.6           0.1           0.9          44.0        
PIP 1.5        0.5           0.5           2.0           1.7           5.4           1.2           0.7           5.2           0.2          18.7        
PST 2.7        1.0           0.8           3.5           2.9           6.3           6.8           1.3           2.8           0.6          28.7        
RLW 23.5      6.9           6.3           30.2         20.5         53.8         34.5         9.4           16.1         6.2          207.3      
SCI 8.8        3.2           2.4           10.4         7.8           22.6         16.5         4.1           9.8           1.5          87.0        
TMS 7.6        2.8           2.2           10.1         8.3           18.7         21.1         3.6           7.4           1.5          83.3        
TPP 6.8        4.4           15.1         13.1         2.6           13.0         6.8           7.3           0.6           4.2          73.9        
TRD 205.4    78.2         67.0         300.6       223.3       535.3       456.6       101.6       386.8       48.2        2,402.9   
TRK 10.2      3.5           3.1           13.6         11.3         24.6         23.0         4.7           12.9         2.2          109.2      
TRO 4.5        1.5           1.3           5.7           5.1           11.2         10.7         2.0           5.7           0.9          48.7        
CLI 3.8        1.6           1.2           5.0           4.4           8.6           12.9         2.0           1.9           0.8          42.3        
Market 
total 747.2    228.8       202.7       975.2       790.0       1,778.0    1,241.5    305.6       962.3       151.1      7,382.4   
a/  Value added defined here does not include taxes.
b/   Sector codes are in Table 1, oblasts in the markets are listed in Table 2. 
Source: Regions of Russia, Roskomstat, and authors' calculations.  31
 
Table 4. Value-Added by Sector as a percent of the Value-Added of the Regional Market





MAR 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6
AGR 14.8 7.6 3.7 8.7 15.8 8.7 1.2 3.9 0.9 10.0
AIR 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.4
CHM 1.9 0.1 0.8 1.1 1.2 2.0 0.6 0.7 0.0 2.8
CNM 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.4
COL 0.0 2.3 1.6 3.3 0.2 0.1
CON 10.2 3.1 3.0 5.6 13.3 8.5 11.2 9.7 2.5 7.6
CRU 1.9 8.3 1.0 4.8 5.5 29.4 0.7
ELE 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.6 2.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.0 3.9
FIN 5.8 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.6 6.0 9.3 6.8 4.9 5.9
FME 2.5 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.5 1.9 0.2 0.4 7.5
FOO 3.3 4.0 1.8 1.8 3.0 1.6 2.7 5.8 0.1 3.1
GAS 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 5.4 0.0
HEA 5.7 7.6 7.2 6.0 5.7 5.7 10.2 7.1 4.2 5.9
HOU 3.0 3.8 3.3 3.0 3.1 2.9 5.5 3.7 1.4 3.0
MWO 5.2 4.9 1.3 2.0 2.3 5.7 3.7 6.2 0.3 2.4
NFM 0.3 3.5 4.6 11.6 0.6 2.6 0.6 1.4 0.1
OIL 1.6 2.1 0.8 1.8 1.3 2.2 0.4 2.4 0.4
OTH 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.2
OTI 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.6
PIP 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1
PST 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4
RLW 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.8 3.1 1.7 4.1
SCI 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.0
TMS 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.0
TPP 0.9 1.9 7.5 1.3 0.3 0.7 0.5 2.4 0.1 2.8
TRD 27.5 34.2 33.0 30.8 28.3 30.1 36.8 33.3 40.2 31.9
TRK 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.5
TRO 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6
CLI 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
See Table 1 for sector codes.
Source: Regions of Russia, Roskomstat.
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Table 5. Share of Sector Value-Added by Regional Market of Russia
(in percent)  







MAR 10.0 2.8 2.9 15.2 8.8 31.3 8.5 3.7 14.7 2.0 100.0
AGR 20.0 3.2 1.3 15.4 22.7 28.2 2.8 2.1 1.5 2.7 100.0
AIR 7.9 2.8 2.1 11.6 10.0 22.1 32.9 3.6 5.5 1.4 100.0
CHM 16.3 0.4 1.8 12.4 10.9 41.6 9.1 2.4 0.1 4.9 100.0
CNM 21.3 2.3 1.5 9.6 13.9 25.2 18.2 4.9 1.6 1.4 100.0
COL 0.3 11.8 7.3 74.2 3.8 2.7 100.0
CON 12.6 1.2 1.0 9.0 17.4 25.1 22.9 4.9 4.0 1.9 100.0
CRU 1.0 3.7 2.2 8.4 21.7 62.8 0.2 100.0
ELE 11.1 3.2 2.9 14.4 9.5 26.2 17.9 4.4 7.9 2.4 100.0
FIN 9.1 3.4 3.0 12.7 9.2 22.3 24.2 4.4 9.8 1.9 100.0
FME 23.0 0.6 1.9 10.9 4.8 40.9 2.8 1.4 13.7 100.0
FOO 15.2 5.6 2.2 10.6 14.6 17.1 20.6 10.8 0.3 2.8 100.0
GAS 0.3 0.7 0.8 2.5 4.8 90.8 0.0 100.0
HEA 8.9 3.7 3.1 12.3 9.4 21.1 26.5 4.6 8.5 1.9 100.0
HOU 9.2 3.7 2.8 12.1 10.3 21.2 28.4 4.7 5.7 1.9 100.0
MWO 14.7 4.3 1.0 7.4 6.8 38.8 17.3 7.2 1.1 1.4 100.0
NFM 1.3 4.1 4.7 57.9 2.5 23.6 3.6 2.2 0.1 100.0
OIL 12.1 4.7 1.5 17.3 10.0 38.9 4.4 7.2 3.9 100.0
OTH 12.3 3.2 3.6 14.0 7.8 29.3 10.0 5.2 11.7 3.0 100.0
OTI 30.8 1.3 1.6 5.7 9.1 20.9 22.5 5.8 0.2 2.1 100.0
PIP 7.8 2.7 2.5 10.5 8.9 28.9 6.4 3.6 27.7 1.0 100.0
PST 9.3 3.5 2.8 12.2 10.1 22.0 23.9 4.5 9.9 1.9 100.0
RLW 11.3 3.3 3.0 14.6 9.9 25.9 16.6 4.5 7.8 3.0 100.0
SCI 10.1 3.6 2.8 11.9 8.9 26.0 18.9 4.7 11.3 1.7 100.0
TMS 9.1 3.3 2.7 12.1 9.9 22.4 25.3 4.3 8.9 1.8 100.0
TPP 9.3 5.9 20.5 17.8 3.5 17.6 9.2 9.8 0.8 5.7 100.0
TRD 8.5 3.3 2.8 12.5 9.3 22.3 19.0 4.2 16.1 2.0 100.0
TRK 9.3 3.2 2.8 12.5 10.4 22.6 21.1 4.3 11.8 2.0 100.0
TRO 9.2 3.1 2.7 11.7 10.5 23.0 21.9 4.2 11.8 1.9 100.0
CLI 9.0 3.7 2.8 11.7 10.5 20.4 30.6 4.7 4.6 1.9 100.0
Total 329.2 99.4 96.2 453.3 284.4 734.1 465.5 128.4 340.9 68.7 3000.0
Source: Regions of Russia and authors calculations.    33
Table 6: Exports by Product and by Regional Market  (in billions of 2001 rubles)





MAR 4.9 1.7 1.7 7.1 4.5 13.7 4.3 2.2 6.9 1.2
AGR 3.1 0.5 0.2 2.4 3.5 4.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4
AIR 5.6 2.4 1.8 7.6 6.8 13.2 18.9 3.0 4.4 1.2
CHM 27.5 0.5 2.0 33.2 18.2 92.0 13.7 5.0 0.3 15.2
CNM 1.8 0.2 0.1 1.7 1.2 3.4 1.6 0.6 0.2 0.2
COL 0.1 4.2 2.6 26.4 1.3 0.9
CON 4.0 0.4 0.3 2.9 5.6 8.0 7.3 1.6 1.3 0.6
CRU 7.1 27.0 15.8 60.3 156.1 452.8 1.6
ELE 1.1 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.0 2.6 1.8 0.4 0.8 0.2
FIN 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.7 1.6 1.8 0.3 0.7 0.1
FME 50.5 1.1 3.7 22.4 11.1 83.8 7.1 4.8 28.3
FOO 8.7 9.7 2.5 12.6 23.1 10.1 27.0 9.2 0.1 3.6
GAS 1.4 3.1 3.6 11.5 21.8 410.7 0.0
HEA 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.1
HOU 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.1
MWO 22.8 14.2 1.9 43.0 23.3 97.0 95.5 30.4 1.9 5.0
NFM 4.6 15.1 18.4 203.1 11.1 101.6 17.2 11.3 0.6
OIL 35.5 13.7 4.5 50.9 29.5 114.4 12.8 21.1 11.5
OTH 1.7 0.4 0.5 1.9 1.1 4.0 1.4 0.7 1.6 0.4
OTI 7.2 0.3 0.4 1.3 2.1 4.9 5.3 1.4 0.0 0.5
PST 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.1
RLW 0.9 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.8 2.0 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.2
SCI 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 1.6 1.1 0.3 0.7 0.1
TMS 0.9 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.0 2.1 2.4 0.4 0.9 0.2
TPP 3.1 17.1 29.2 35.1 1.7 13.3 2.1 12.7 0.4 8.1
TRD 2.0 0.8 0.7 3.0 2.2 5.3 4.5 1.0 3.9 0.5
TRK 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.1
TRO 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 1.3 1.2 0.2 0.7 0.1
CLI 2.6 1.1 0.8 3.4 3.1 6.0 9.0 1.4 1.3 0.5
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and region definitions.
Source: Roskomstat unpublished surveys and authors' calculations.     34
Table 7. Sector Exports as a Percent of Total Exports of the Regional Market





M A R 3221222212
A G R 2100210001
A I R 3322328302
C H M 1 41278 1 2650 2 2
C N M 1000101100
C O L 043510
C O N 2001213101
CRU 8 26 3 27 20 50 2
E L E 1000001000
F I N 0000001000
F M E 2 61455 1 134 4 1
FOO 5 10 2 3 10 1 11 8 0 5
G A S 23153 4 50
H E A 0000000000
H O U 0000000000
M W O 1 21 5 2 91 01 34 02 8 0 7
NFM 2 16 18 42 5 13 7 10 1
OIL 19 15 4 10 13 15 5 19 1
O T H 1000011101
O T I 4000112101
P S T 0000000000
R L W 0000001000
S C I 0000000000
T M S 0000001000
T P P 2 1 8 2 87121 1 20 1 2
T R D 1111112101
T R K 0000000000
T R O 0000001000
C L I 1111114101
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and region definitions.
Source: Roskomstat unpublished surveys and authors' calculations.     35
Table 8.  Sector Export Intensities by Regional Market: Exports of the Sector as a 
  Percent of Production of the Sector (in percent)





M A R 5 35 75 75 15 35 05 45 75 15 7
A G R 1111111111
A I R 4 64 84 84 44 54 34 34 84 74 8
CHM 27 21 17 48 27 37 24 35 40 57
C N M 3336353447
C O L 2 32 32 32 32 32 3
C O N 3333333333
CRU 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
E L E 2222222222
F I N 1111111111
F M E 4 03 53 43 74 33 74 87 5 3 7
F O O 4 1 288 1 149639
G A S 2 72 72 72 72 7 2 72 7
H E A 0000000000
H O U 1111111111
M W O 1 12 51 44 82 51 84 53 21 22 7
N F M 4 44 54 84 35 85 56 26 7 7 9
O I L 3 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 2
O T H 1 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 2
O T I 1 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 5
P S T 9999999999
R L W 2222222222
S C I 3333333333
T M S 7777777777
TPP 7 77 33 48 11 17 5 30 12 33
T R D 1111111111
T R K 2222222222
T R O 5555555555
C L I 1 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1
Total 364 534 474 545 488 477 397 459 357 510
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and region definitions.
Source: Roskomstat unpublished surveys and authors' calculations.    36
Table 9:  Imports by Product and by Regional Market (in x 2001 rubles)





AGR 4.6 1.4 0.8 4.3 5.0 7.6 7.9 2.0 1.3 0.8
AIR 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.1
CHM 12.5 4.0 2.8 18.8 9.7 25.5 47.9 8.9 4.9 3.6
C N M 2 . 70 . 50 . 43 . 32 . 84 . 6 1 1 . 62 . 20 . 80 . 7
COL 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.3 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
CON 8.0 4.0 3.4 10.2 10.0 20.4 15.3 4.7 16.4 1.7
C R U 1 . 50 . 60 . 22 . 21 . 45 . 10 . 60 . 91 . 10 . 0
ELE 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1
FIN 1.6 0.6 0.5 2.2 1.6 3.7 4.2 0.8 1.7 0.3
FME 9.5 1.2 0.8 3.1 7.8 11.7 13.4 4.3 2.9 2.8
FOO 19.1 7.2 3.0 14.4 17.9 25.3 79.1 36.2 4.2 7.7
GAS 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
HEA 0.9 0.4 0.3 1.3 1.0 2.3 2.8 0.5 0.9 0.2
HOU 3.5 1.4 1.1 4.6 3.9 8.0 10.7 1.8 2.2 0.7
MWO 35.8 14.3 8.2 18.0 31.1 60.3 198.5 49.6 20.1 10.9
NFM 3.9 2.1 1.5 13.2 4.7 10.9 9.2 3.5 2.2 1.2
OIL 4.1 1.1 1.0 4.5 4.0 9.0 6.4 1.6 3.3 0.8
OTH 1.7 0.6 0.5 2.2 1.7 4.1 3.7 0.8 2.0 0.4
OTI 1.2 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.2
P S T 0 . 10 . 00 . 00 . 10 . 10 . 20 . 20 . 00 . 10 . 0
RLW 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0
SCI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
TMS 0.8 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.8 1.8 2.0 0.4 0.7 0.2
TPP 2.7 0.6 1.1 0.7 3.6 2.0 22.1 7.3 0.1 2.8
TRD 1.0 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.1 2.6 2.4 0.5 1.5 0.2
TRK 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.1
TRO 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0
CLI 25 10 8 32 29 56 84 13 13 5
Total 142 52 35 142 140 268 528 140 81 41
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and region definitions.
Source: Roskomstat unpublished surveys and authors' calculations.     37
Table 10.  Sector Imports as a Percent of Total Imports of the Regional Market





A G R 3323431122
A I R 0000000000
C H M 988 1 37 1 09669
C N M 2112222212
C O L 0011000001
C O N 68 1 077833 2 04
C R U 1112120110
E L E 0000000000
F I N 1122111121
F M E 7222643347
FOO 13 14 9 10 13 9 15 26 5 19
G A S 0000000000
H E A 1111111010
H O U 2333332132
M W O 2 52 82 31 32 22 33 83 52 52 7
N F M 3449342233
O I L 3233331142
O T H 1112121121
O T I 1111110010
P S T 0000000000
R L W 0000000000
S C I 0000000000
T M S 1111110010
T P P 2131314507
T R D 1111110021
T R K 0000000010
T R O 0000000000
C L I 1 72 02 22 32 12 11 6 91 51 3
Total 142 52 35 142 140 268 528 140 81 41
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and region definitions.
Source: Roskomstat unpublished surveys and authors' calculations.     38
Table 11.  Sector Import Intensities by Regional Market: Regional Imports of the 
       Sector as a Percent of Regional Consumption of the Product





A G R 4444444444
A I R 3333333333
CHM 35 36 30 47 29 33 74 58 19 57
CNM 13 16 13 18 10 11 29 25 8 20
C O L 7777777777
C O N 8888888888
C R U 5555555555
E L E 1111111111
F I N 1111111111
F M E 3 21 71 91 43 61 73 83 72 57 5
F O O 2 52 31 31 52 01 53 19 41 05 0
G A S 2222222222
H E A 1111111111
H O U 8888888888
M W O 3 63 72 41 52 72 69 8 1 0 01 65 3
N F M 1 64 04 19 63 52 33 94 12 32 5
O I L 8888888888
O T H 1 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 9
O T I 7666667766
P S T 2222222222
R L W 0000000010
S C I 0000000000
T M S 6666666666
T P P 1 31 12 8 41 9 56 08 3 17 8
T R D 0000000000
T R K 2222222222
T R O 1111111111
C L I 7 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 3
Total 142 52 35 142 140 268 528 140 81 41
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and region definitions.
Source: Roskomstat unpublished surveys and authors' calculations.     39
(ad-valorem in %) -- by sector
Electric industry 2.6 0.0 0.0
Oil extraction 0.0 7.9 0.0
Oil processing 4.5 4.6 0.0
Gas 5.0 18.8 0.0
Coalmining 2.2 0.0 0.0
Other fuel industries  5.0 2.6 0.0
Ferrous metallurgy 5.9 0.4 1.5
Non-ferrous metallurgy 8.5 5.3 1.5
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 7.5 1.6 1.5
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 10.7 0.0 0.0
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 13.5 6.9 0.0
Construction materials industry 12.0 1.6 0.0
Textiles and Apparel 16.8 4.1 0.5
Food industry 14.1 3.1 0.5
Other industries  12.4 0.0 0.5
Agriculture & forestry 8.4 0.6 0.0
Other goods-producing sectors  14.6 0.0 0.5
Telecommunications 33.0 0.0
Science & science servicing (market) 33.0 0.0
Financial services  36.0 0.0
Railway transportation 33.0 0.0
Truck transportation 33.0 0.0
Pipelines transportation 33.0 0.0
Maritime transportation 95.0 80.0
Air transportation 90.0 75.0
Other transportation 33.0 0.0
Source: Tarr, Shepotylo and Koudoyarov (2005) for tariff rates; Kimura et al. (2004a,b,c) for barriers to FDI; 
Roskomstat for export tax rates; authors' estimates for change in world market prices.





Table 12a.  Tariff Rates, Export Tax Rates, Estimated Ad Valorem Equivalence of 












Moscow 0.47 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.13
St. Petersburg 0.70 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.08 0.30 0.20 0.18
Tumen 0.29 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.46 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.08
Northwest 0.70 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.08 0.30 0.20 0.20
North 0.70 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.08 0.30 0.20 0.20
Central 0.41 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.09
South 0.46 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.09
Urals 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.04
Siberia 0.28 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.26 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.07
Far East 0.70 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.08 0.30 0.20 0.20
National average 0.35 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.10
Table 12b.  Shares of Business Services Sectors in the Regions of Russia Captured   
by Multinational Firms (ad-valorem in %) -- by sector
Maritime Pipeline Financial
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Table 13a.  Impact of WTO Accession on Regional Markets (% change from base year)
Overall St. North- Far 
average Moscow Peters. Tumen west North Central South Urals Siberia East
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 7.8 7.0 10.6 13.8 11.2 9.8 7.6 8.3 6.2 7.6 9.7
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 4.3 4.7 5.7 3.1 6.2 4.7 4.2 4.7 3.3 4.2 5.2
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 3.3 4.9 6.4 4.4 6.1 5.2 4.8 4.4 3.7 3.6 5.4
Regional exports (% change) 1.9 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.4
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.5 2.6 3.4 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.8 1.9 1.9 3.0
International exports (% change) 9.4 13.3 19.1 2.8 17.3 7.7 23.0 10.9 10.8 8.0 11.1
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  4.1 4.7 6.6 4.2 6.1 5.5 3.8 4.9 2.5 4.1 6.2
Skilled labor  4.2 3.5 7.4 3.8 7.2 5.7 5.3 5.1 2.9 4.4 6.9
National capital 4.0 4.2 4.9 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.3 3.4 3.4 4.6
Regional mobile capital  6.5 6.6 10.2 5.4 10.2 7.6 6.9 6.5 5.5 6.1 8.0
Crude oil resources  4.9 5.6 4.1 5.3 5.4 2.9 2.8 5.9
Natural gas resources 1.8 2.9 -17.2 -9.1 -5.0 -9.9 -12.3 -9.1
Coal resources 10.8 14.1 13.7 13.6 10.6 9.8 14.2
Specific capital in domestic firms -24.7 -32.3 -26.4 -47.5 -23.7 -27.4 -19.7 -26.3 -18.6 -21.0 -30.4
Specific capital in multinational firms 101.4 60.4 45.6 228.1 79.2 148.3 116.6 130.6 144.1 165.2 118.0
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) A 2.3 2.1 3.2 1.5 4.2 2.1 2.6 1.7 2.3 2.1 2.8
Skilled labor (% changing sector) A 2.5 2.6 3.9 1.9 4.1 2.5 2.9 2.0 2.4 2.4 3.2
Source: Authors' calculations.    42









Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 6.7 5.5 8.4 11.5 9.0 8.9 7.3 7.2 5.9 6.8 8.4
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 3.7 3.8 4.5 2.6 5.0 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.2 3.8 4.5
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 1.7 2.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.9
Regional exports (% change) 1.8 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.6 2.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.0
Real exchange rate (% change) 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.5
International exports (% change) 2.9 5.1 5.5 2.5 5.6 3.1 5.2 2.6 1.8 2.3 4.1
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  3.3 2.6 5.1 3.0 4.5 5.0 3.5 3.7 2.5 3.5 5.3
Skilled labor  2.1 0.9 3.9 2.5 4.2 4.3 2.6 2.6 1.2 2.5 4.3
National capital 2.1 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.4
Regional mobile capital  3.8 3.4 5.6 3.9 5.8 5.2 4.3 4.2 2.9 3.5 5.3
Crude oil resources  4.0 4.4 3.9 4.9 3.8 2.6 3.8 4.5
Natural gas resources 1.7 2.2 -8.8 -3.9 -4.2 -3.6 -2.1 -6.2
Coal resources 7.9 9.9 7.3 8.2 6.4 7.6 9.1
Specific capital in domestic firms -20.4 -27.4 -19.1 -47.7 -18.2 -23.8 -14.2 -22.2 -14.0 -18.7 -25.1
Specific capital in multinational firms 86.3 53.2 44.2 198.9 68.4 126.9 96.6 106.1 118.6 137.5 100.1
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.8
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 1.8 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.2 2.4 1.6 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.5
See Table 2 for definition of regional markets
Source: Authors' estimates
Table 13b.  Impact of Full Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization in Services  on Regional 
Markets: Welfare, Trade and Factor Market Effects
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Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 4.2 4.3 6.0 6.4 6.1 4.8 3.7 4.5 3.2 4.0 5.1
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 2.4 2.9 3.2 1.5 3.4 2.3 2.0 2.6 1.7 2.2 2.7
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 2.1 3.5 4.6 2.5 4.2 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.2 3.6
Regional exports (% change) 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.6 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.0 0.7 0.4 1.4
Real exchange rate (% change) 1.8 2.0 2.5 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.3 1.0 2.1
International exports (% change) 7.3 9.3 14.6 1.6 14.3 6.7 18.5 8.8 9.1 6.2 9.4
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  1.6 2.5 3.1 1.5 2.7 1.7 1.2 2.1 0.4 1.4 2.3
Skilled labor  2.1 2.0 3.8 1.3 3.5 2.0 2.7 2.6 1.6 2.0 3.0
National capital 2.5 2.8 3.3 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.9 2.8 2.1 1.8 2.9
Regional mobile capital  3.9 4.4 6.3 2.8 6.3 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.7 4.6
Crude oil resources  2.2 2.5 1.7 2.1 2.8 1.0 0.1 2.9
Natural gas resources 0.0 0.7 -14.7 -8.0 -3.0 -8.7 -12.3 -6.6
Coal resources 4.3 6.6 7.8 6.8 4.8 3.5 7.3
Specific capital in domestic firms -11.5 -15.5 -14.4 -17.0 -13.0 -14.1 -10.3 -12.0 -8.5 -8.2 -16.1
Specific capital in multinational firms 42.0 25.3 18.2 90.4 35.8 70.0 49.9 57.6 54.1 67.1 56.2
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 2.0 1.7 2.4 1.0 3.3 2.0 2.2 1.5 2.3 2.1 2.4
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 1.9 1.8 2.6 1.0 2.9 2.1 2.3 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.4
See Table 2 for definition of regional markets
Source: Authors' estimates
Table 13c.   Impact of Partial Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization in Services  on Regional 
Markets: Welfare, Trade and Factor Market Effects
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Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.3 0.5 0.5 -2.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3
Regional exports (% change) 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.1
Real exchange rate (% change) -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.4
International exports (% change) 0.6 -1.0 1.2 0.3 3.2 -0.1 2.6 0.0 1.4 0.5 -1.8
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4
Skilled labor  0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.2
National capital 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.4
Regional mobile capital  0.4 0.4 0.7 -0.4 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2
Crude oil resources  -1.4 -0.9 -2.5 -1.9 -1.8 -2.3 -2.7 -1.1
Natural gas resources -2.5 -1.6 -13.9 -9.3 -9.3 -11.8 -12.9 -6.3
Coal resources -1.7 -0.8 -1.0 -0.8 -1.2 -2.1 -0.1
Specific capital in domestic firms -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 0.1 0.3
Specific capital in multinational firms 2.0 0.4 -0.3 4.5 1.6 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.9 5.0 2.1
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.3 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.8
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.0
See Table 2 for definition of regional markets
Source: Authors' estimates
Table 13d.   Impact of Improved External Market Access on Regional Markets:  Welfare, Trade 
and Factor Market Effects
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Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.7 0.9 1.6 4.6 1.4 0.7 -0.2 0.7 -0.1 0.6 0.9
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.5
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 1.4 3.1 3.9 1.9 3.5 2.6 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.7
Regional exports (% change) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.2
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.0 2.1 2.5 1.4 2.3 1.6 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.7
International exports (% change) 5.5 9.3 9.0 0.1 8.2 4.8 13.1 7.7 7.3 5.1 9.6
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  1.2 2.2 2.2 1.4 1.8 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.3 1.3 1.3
Skilled labor  2.0 2.2 2.8 1.6 2.7 1.6 2.3 2.2 1.6 1.9 2.6
National capital 1.7 1.8 2.2 1.2 2.0 1.3 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.5
Regional mobile capital  2.2 2.7 3.3 1.9 3.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.5
Crude oil resources  2.3 1.9 3.0 2.2 3.6 2.8 1.7 2.0
Natural gas resources 1.2 0.7 1.6 2.5 9.9 6.1 1.2 0.2
Coal resources 3.2 3.6 6.5 5.0 4.4 3.0 3.3
Specific capital in domestic firms -3.4 -3.7 -4.6 0.7 -3.5 -3.3 -4.2 -3.2 -3.7 -2.0 -5.4
Specific capital in multinational firms 10.9 5.8 1.0 21.0 6.6 15.5 13.5 17.4 18.6 19.3 13.7
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.6 1.6 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.1 2.4
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.8 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.8 2.0
See Table 2 for definition of regional markets
Source: Authors' estimates
Table 13e.   Impact of Tariff Reductions on Regional Markets of Russia: Welfare, Trade and  
Factor Market Effects
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Table 14.  Decomposition of Welfare Impacts for the Regional Markets ─ WTO Scenario 









Skilled wages 0.7 0.3 1.2 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.0
Unskilled wages 1.6 1.0 2.5 3.7 2.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.2 1.8 2.1
Capital Earnings
National capital 2.7 4.1 3.9 -0.2 1.7 3.5 1.5 2.9 1.3 1.5 4.3
Regional mobile capital  3.2 1.7 4.6 7.9 6.2 3.7 4.3 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.3
Regional energy rents 0.2 4.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Specific capital in domestic firms -1.9 -1.3 -2.4 -5.2 -2.7 -2.4 -2.5 -1.8 -2.0 -1.9 -2.1
Specific capital in multinational firms 1.0 0.7 1.1 2.9 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
Tax and Terms of Trade Effects
Regional investment -0.4 -0.1 -0.7 -2.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7
Value of stock changes 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
Value of capital flows (terms of trade) -0.9 -1.0 -1.3 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.1
Change in lumpsum taxes 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Total Welfare Change (% Consump) 7.8 7.0 10.6 13.8 11.2 9.8 7.6 8.3 6.2 7.6 9.7
See Table 2 for definition of regional markets
Source: Authors' estimates    47
Table 15.  Impact of WTO Accession on Output by Sector and Regional Market 
       (percentage change)





FME 33.1 13.1 44.8 23.7 15.2 19.7 43.6 352.3 10.5
CHM 8.3 21.5 10.4 -1.9 12.7 0.1 2.9 4.9 45.3 28.6
NFM 10.9 4.5 33.8 10.2 22.7 6.1 35.4 -0.1 -11.6
TMS 9.2 5.0 9.0 16.6 -2.3 16.7 -4.3 15.8 11.3 16.8
TRK 7.7 5.3 6.9 9.6 3.1 11.2 2.9 10.8 7.0 11.9
COL 5.6 3.7 5.5 5.7 4.8 5.2
T R D 6 . 04 . 14 . 44 . 23 . 95 . 34 . 36 . 52 . 78 . 0
E L E 1 . 91 . 61 . 81 . 01 . 40 . 70 . 41 . 90 . 34 . 0
SCI -0.6 1.3 -0.1 2.9 -1.2 3.7 -0.1 4.8 -0.5 4.5
H O U 0 . 91 . 21 . 91 . 80 . 41 . 91 . 41 . 32 . 21 . 6
PST 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.6 0.5 2.1 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.6
H E A 1 . 21 . 21 . 61 . 41 . 01 . 61 . 41 . 61 . 21 . 7
CRU 0.9 1.4 1.7 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.3
RLW 3.2 -0.1 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.8 -1.1 4.6 0.7 2.6
OIL 4.0 -2.5 3.6 2.2 -1.7 3.0 -0.7 -2.8 6.2
G A S - 1 . 4- 0 . 2- 0 . 5- 1 . 0- 0 . 6 1 . 1- 1 . 9
CON 0.5 -1.6 0.6 -1.4 -0.1 -1.4 1.6 -2.7 2.2 -4.7
TPP -7.0 -4.6 -10.1 -0.6 -2.3 29.9 -13.2 -8.9 15.3 -10.6
AIR -1.4 -5.1 -1.4 1.1 -3.4 0.6 -2.5 -2.6 4.8 -2.7
C L I - 1 . 8- 4 . 5- 2 . 1- 3 . 1- 3 . 2- 2 . 9- 3 . 8- 6 . 1 1 . 3- 7 . 1
P I P - 2 . 4- 4 . 6- 3 . 1- 4 . 6- 2 . 8- 4 . 6- 5 . 9- 6 . 0- 0 . 2- 1 . 3
MWO -9.4 0.4 -1.7 -6.1 -9.0 -4.0 8.7 -2.4 -1.7 -11.2
O T I - 3 . 8- 6 . 2- 2 . 6- 4 . 5- 4 . 3- 5 . 9- 0 . 3- 3 . 6- 1 . 5- 6 . 0
A G R - 3 . 2- 4 . 0- 2 . 2- 4 . 6- 1 . 8- 5 . 4- 3 . 7- 9 . 7 2 . 8 - 1 1 . 4
F I N - 6 . 2- 6 . 7- 6 . 1- 6 . 6- 6 . 7- 6 . 3- 6 . 6- 6 . 0- 7 . 1- 5 . 3
MAR -4.3 -11.7 -6.8 -4.9 -6.1 -3.6 -9.3 -6.0 -5.8 -8.1
TRO -6.2 -11.0 -7.5 -2.3 -15.6 -1.8 -19.4 -2.2 -10.0 -1.1
CNM -7.4 -11.4 -5.6 -8.0 -7.1 -9.0 -12.7 -14.1 1.6 -15.7
OTH -7.0 -13.9 -8.7 -13.3 -6.9 -14.7 -7.0 -17.2 -4.6 -21.1
FOO -13.5 -11.9 -10.6 -8.8 -11.3 -12.5 -17.1 -13.9 0.4 -17.0
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and regional market definitions. 
Source: Authors' calculations.    48
Table 16.  Impact of WTO Accession on Skilled Employment by Sector and Regional Market 
(percentage change)





FME 33.4 13.7 45.0 24.0 16.5 19.4 45.9 355.6 11.3
CHM 8.4 22.1 10.6 -1.6 14.0 -0.1 4.8 5.6 46.1 29.5
NFM 11.3 5.1 34.3 10.8 24.3 6.0 38.0 0.9 -10.7
TMS 9.2 5.5 9.2 17.0 -1.3 16.6 -2.7 16.5 11.9 17.5
TRK 7.1 5.2 6.6 9.3 3.5 10.5 3.9 10.7 7.1 11.6
COL 8.0 5.3 8.0 8.0 7.6 6.9
TRD 5.2 3.8 3.5 3.2 4.7 3.5 5.7 6.0 2.1 7.6
OIL 5.0 -1.5 4.4 3.3 0.0 3.5 1.5 -1.2 7.3
HOU 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 1.8 2.0 3.5 2.4 3.0 2.7
ELE 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.3 2.6 0.5 2.1 2.6 0.8 4.8
RLW 3.2 0.3 1.1 0.7 1.6 0.6 0.3 5.2 1.2 3.1
SCI -1.4 1.2 -0.3 2.8 -0.9 3.1 1.2 4.7 -0.3 4.2
HEA 0.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.9 2.7 1.4 1.5 1.3
CON 0.3 -1.3 0.6 -1.3 0.6 -1.7 3.0 -2.4 2.6 -4.5
CRU -1.5 0.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.9 1.7 -2.9
PST -0.9 -0.7 -0.3 -1.1 -0.1 -1.2 1.1 -1.2 -0.4 -0.8
TPP -7.3 -4.5 -10.1 -0.6 -1.8 29.3 -12.0 -8.7 15.6 -10.5
A I R - 2 . 8- 5 . 8- 2 . 4- 0 . 1- 3 . 7- 1 . 0- 2 . 1- 3 . 9 4 . 2- 4 . 1
C L I - 2 . 4- 4 . 3- 2 . 0- 3 . 0- 2 . 8- 3 . 2- 2 . 2- 6 . 1 1 . 9- 7 . 2
AGR -2.7 -3.2 -1.6 -3.8 -0.3 -5.2 -1.5 -8.5 3.7 -10.2
O T I - 4 . 5- 6 . 1- 2 . 7- 4 . 6- 4 . 0- 6 . 3 1 . 2- 3 . 7- 1 . 1- 6 . 3
P I P - 3 . 2- 5 . 1- 4 . 0- 5 . 6- 2 . 0- 6 . 3- 4 . 7- 6 . 4- 0 . 9- 1 . 6
MWO -10.6 -0.3 -2.6 -7.2 -9.2 -5.6 9.5 -3.5 -2.2 -12.2
MAR -5.3 -12.1 -7.6 -6.0 -5.9 -5.2 -8.6 -6.9 -6.3 -9.0
TRO -6.6 -11.0 -7.9 -2.7 -15.1 -2.7 -18.5 -2.3 -10.0 -1.2
CNM -7.5 -11.1 -5.4 -7.7 -6.2 -9.2 -11.2 -13.6 2.2 -15.2
F I N - 8 . 8- 8 . 8- 8 . 5- 9 . 7- 8 . 0- 9 . 8- 7 . 2- 9 . 0- 9 . 3- 8 . 5
FOO -13.1 -11.2 -10.1 -8.2 -10.1 -12.3 -15.4 -12.9 1.2 -16.1
OTH -8.1 -14.3 -9.3 -13.9 -7.0 -15.6 -6.2 -17.9 -4.8 -21.9
GAS -16.0 -9.6 -14.1 -12.4 -15.0 -0.9 -22.7
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and regional market definitions. 
Source: Authors' calculations.  49
 
Table 17.  Impact of WTO Accession on Unskilled Employment by Sector and 
     Regional Market (percentage change)





F M E 3 5 . 21 4 . 04 5 . 32 4 . 31 7 . 02 0 . 14 4 . 1 3 5 9 . 0 1 2 . 5
CHM 9.9 22.5 10.9 -1.3 14.4 0.5 3.5 6.4 45.5 30.9
NFM 12.9 5.4 34.6 11.1 24.8 6.6 36.3 1.7 -9.7
TMS 10.7 5.8 9.4 17.3 -0.9 17.3 -3.9 17.4 11.5 18.7
TRK 8.6 5.5 6.8 9.6 3.9 11.2 2.6 11.5 6.6 12.8
COL 9.5 5.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.5
TRD 6.6 4.1 3.7 3.4 5.1 4.1 4.4 6.8 1.7 8.8
OIL 6.4 -1.2 4.6 3.6 0.4 4.1 0.3 -0.4 6.9
HOU 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.2 3.2 2.6 3.8
ELE 3.5 2.4 2.3 1.6 3.0 1.1 0.8 3.4 0.4 5.9
R L W 4 . 60 . 61 . 31 . 02 . 01 . 3 - 0 . 95 . 90 . 84 . 2
SCI 0.0 1.5 -0.1 3.0 -0.5 3.7 0.0 5.4 -0.7 5.3
HEA 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 2.2 1.0 2.4
CON 1.7 -1.1 0.8 -1.1 1.0 -1.2 1.7 -1.6 2.2 -3.5
CRU -1.2 0.5 -0.1 0.5 -0.3 1.3 -1.9
PST 0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.8 0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 0.3
TPP -6.0 -4.2 -10.0 -0.4 -1.3 30.1 -13.0 -8.0 15.1 -9.5
AIR -1.5 -5.5 -2.2 0.1 -3.4 -0.4 -3.3 -3.2 3.8 -3.0
C L I - 1 . 0- 4 . 1- 1 . 8- 2 . 8- 2 . 4- 2 . 6- 3 . 4- 5 . 4 1 . 5- 6 . 2
AGR -1.3 -2.9 -1.4 -3.5 0.1 -4.6 -2.7 -7.8 3.3 -9.2
O T I - 3 . 2- 5 . 9- 2 . 5- 4 . 4- 3 . 6- 5 . 8- 0 . 1- 3 . 0- 1 . 5- 5 . 3
P I P - 1 . 8- 4 . 8- 3 . 8- 5 . 4- 1 . 6- 5 . 7- 5 . 9- 5 . 7- 1 . 3- 0 . 6
MWO -9.3 0.0 -2.4 -7.0 -8.9 -5.0 8.2 -2.8 -2.6 -11.3
MAR -3.9 -11.9 -7.4 -5.7 -5.5 -4.6 -9.7 -6.2 -6.6 -8.0
TRO -5.3 -10.8 -7.7 -2.5 -14.7 -2.1 -19.5 -1.5 -10.4 -0.1
CNM -6.2 -10.8 -5.2 -7.4 -5.8 -8.6 -12.3 -13.0 1.8 -14.3
F I N - 7 . 5- 8 . 5- 8 . 3- 9 . 5- 7 . 6- 9 . 3- 8 . 3- 8 . 4- 9 . 7- 7 . 5
FOO -11.9 -11.0 -10.0 -7.9 -9.7 -11.8 -16.4 -12.3 0.8 -15.2
OTH -6.8 -14.1 -9.1 -13.7 -6.7 -15.1 -7.4 -17.3 -5.2 -21.1
GAS -15.8 -9.4 -13.8 -12.1 -14.5 -1.3 -21.9
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and regional market definitions. 
Source: Authors' calculations.    50
Table 18.  Impact of WTO Accession on Exports by Sector and Regional Market 
     (percentage change)





FME 61.0 30.1 76.6 49.7 34.2 45.1 70.2 423.5 26.3
CHM 31.6 39.8 35.4 18.7 32.1 21.0 23.2 21.8 82.8 44.2
SCI 21.3 18.6 22.0 42.6 17.2 43.0 19.1 41.9 25.6 39.8
NFM 21.2 11.3 47.7 19.3 34.0 14.6 48.3 3.2 -11.2
TMS 14.9 5.8 13.8 28.0 -0.3 27.0 -4.3 21.0 20.9 20.4
CLI 15.6 7.8 14.7 12.1 11.3 12.1 9.3 4.5 22.9 1.8
COL 9.1 1.6 9.4 10.4 3.9 9.7
OIL 9.4 -1.6 9.0 7.3 -0.4 8.1 2.2 -1.1 13.0
TRK 7.0 1.5 5.8 6.5 2.4 7.5 2.6 4.7 8.5 4.4
FIN 5.0 0.2 4.9 6.8 1.4 6.9 3.2 5.7 6.6 4.9
TPP 0.9 -4.8 -2.0 6.0 0.9 36.1 -6.6 -5.2 28.2 -10.2
MWO -1.4 5.3 7.9 2.2 -3.0 4.2 19.1 4.3 11.0 -7.7
AGR 6.5 -3.3 7.2 4.2 1.0 3.4 -0.6 -4.7 16.8 -9.5
CRU 1.6 2.4 2.9 1.3 2.1 2.9 1.3
OTI 2.1 -2.9 4.4 0.3 0.5 -1.7 8.4 2.9 4.6 -1.3
CNM 3.5 -6.6 6.5 3.1 -1.6 2.2 -5.3 -7.1 17.9 -11.4
PST 2.6 -1.7 2.9 1.1 -0.7 0.7 -2.1 -5.0 7.1 -5.8
AIR 0.7 -6.6 0.2 2.6 -3.4 1.8 -2.6 -4.3 9.5 -5.3
HEA 0.9 -2.9 -0.2 -3.0 0.2 -3.0 -0.2 -3.8 1.3 -5.2
CON 0.9 -3.8 1.1 -3.0 -0.2 -3.3 3.7 -6.4 4.7 -9.8
ELE -0.1 -3.1 0.2 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -1.5 -5.7 0.9 -4.9
TRD 0.9 -3.8 0.0 -2.9 -2.3 -2.0 -2.8 -6.2 1.9 -6.5
FOO -4.6 -9.0 -1.6 -1.8 -6.3 -5.4 -10.8 -6.9 12.9 -14.1
HOU -3.6 -5.7 -2.4 -5.2 -4.1 -5.5 -2.9 -9.6 0.4 -10.6
RLW -1.6 -7.4 -4.1 -7.2 -3.2 -7.6 -5.1 -6.9 -1.4 -9.9
MAR -3.6 -14.7 -6.2 -4.5 -7.1 -3.6 -9.1 -8.5 -3.4 -11.7
TRO -5.8 -13.4 -7.1 -3.3 -16.4 -3.0 -19.2 -6.6 -7.4 -6.8
OTH -6.2 -17.2 -8.8 -15.8 -6.3 -18.5 -7.0 -22.7 -1.9 -27.5
GAS -40.8 -17.0 -33.2 -31.6 -33.9 2.3 -71.2
PIP
See Tables 1 and 2 for sector and regional market definitions. 
Source: Authors' calculations.    51
Table 19.  Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis -- Welfare Impacts as a percent of GDP by Region 
(% change from base year)
Overall St. North- Far 
Parameter being changed average Moscow Peters. Tumen west North Central South Urals Siberia East
Central Results for reference 4.3 4.7 5.7 3.1 6.2 4.7 4.2 4.7 3.3 4.2 5.2
regional investment potential variation 
a/  4.2 5.1 6.0 3.3 5.6 4.0 3.8 4.2 3.2 3.6 4.6
esubconsumer = 1.5 4.5 5.0 6.1 3.2 6.1 5.0 4.5 5.0 3.5 4.5 5.5
esubconsumer = 0.5 4.1 4.5 5.4 3.0 5.9 4.1 4.0 4.5 3.1 4.0 4.9
esubs = 2.0 5.5 5.9 7.3 4.3 7.2 6.1 5.5 6.0 4.3 5.4 6.6
esubs = 0.5 3.5 4.0 4.8 2.4 5.2 2.4 3.6 3.9 2.6 3.5 3.9
sigmadm = 4 4.3 4.8 5.8 3.2 6.3 4.8 4.2 4.8 3.3 4.3 5.2
sigmadm = 2 4.3 4.7 5.7 3.1 6.2 4.7 4.2 4.7 3.3 4.2 5.2
etaf = 17.5 4.8 5.2 6.1 3.5 6.7 5.2 4.7 5.3 3.8 4.8 5.6
etaf = 12.5 3.7 4.2 5.2 2.7 5.6 3.9 3.6 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.6
etad = 10 4.4 5.2 6.1 3.1 6.4 5.0 4.3 4.6 3.3 4.3 5.5
etad = 5 4.0 4.1 5.1 3.1 6.0 4.3 4.1 4.5 3.3 4.1 4.7
esub = 4 4.3 4.7 5.5 3.2 6.0 4.6 4.2 4.7 3.4 4.3 5.1
esub = 2 4.3 4.7 5.5 3.2 6.0 4.6 4.2 4.7 3.4 4.3 5.1
esubprimary = 1.5 4.3 4.7 5.7 3.1 6.3 4.7 4.3 4.7 3.4 4.2 5.1
esubprimary = 0.5 4.3 4.9 5.7 3.1 5.9 4.8 4.0 4.8 3.1 4.2 5.4
etadx = 7 4.3 4.8 5.8 3.0 6.3 4.7 4.3 4.8 3.3 4.2 5.2
etadx = 3 4.3 4.6 5.6 3.3 6.1 4.7 4.2 4.7 3.3 4.2 5.1
Source: Authors' calculations.
a/  We vary etaf by region as follows: Moscow = 20; St. Petersburg = 18.3; Tumen = 17.1; Northwest = 11.3;  North = 10; 
Notes:
    and lump sum tax replacement. 
b. Hicksian equivalent variation as a percent of the value of consumption in the benchmark equilibrium.
Parameter  Central Definitions of the parameter (see figures, especially figure 4) 
value for more precise elasticity structure).
esubs 1.25 Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services
esub 3 Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
sigmadm 3 "Armington" elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods in CRTS sectors
esubprimary 0 Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added
esubintermed 0 Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington 
aggregate goods
esubconsumer 1 Elasticity of substitution in consumer demand
etadx 5 Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports)
etad 7.5 Elasticity of Russian service firm supply with respect to price of output
etaf 15 Elasticity of multinational service firm supply with respect to price of output
a. The piecemeal sensitivity analysis employs central values for all parameters (see below) other than the tested parameter 
    Central = 12.5; South = 11.5; Urals = 14.3;   Siberia = 10.8; Far East = 10.8. 
   52
 
Figure 1.   Sales for Constant Returns to Scale Sectors: Determined by 
Constant  Elasticity of Transformation Production Structure
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Figure  2.   Demand for Representative CRTS good g in Regional Market r
CES
σ = sigmadm a/
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σ = 2 * sigmadm
a/ sigmadm = 3 in CRTS sectors, except in OTH (other goods producing sectors). For OTH we rely on estimates from Ivanova (2005).
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Figure  3.   Demand for Representative Dixit-Stiglitz (IRTS) 
good g in Regional Market r
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Figure 4.   Structure of Production for Increasing Returns to Scale Russian Firms: 
Representative Good or Service in a  Representative  Regional Market (RM) m
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Figure  5.   Demand for Representative Business Service s
(Dixit-Stiglitz) Sectors in Regional Market (RM) m
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Figure 6.   Structure of Production for Increasing Returns to Scale Multinational Business Service Firms: 
Representative Business Service in a Representative Regional Market (RM) m
Gross output
CES
σ = 15 = etaf
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Appendix A 
Data on multinational shares of service sectors 
 
We consulted four sources of information: (1) estimates from Russian service sector institutes of 
the share by sector of multinational ownership in the key services sectors; (2) the NOBUS survey; 
(3) Regions of Russia (2003) by Rosstat; and (4) the “BEEPS survey.  Of these four sources, only 
the NOBUS survey provides data that allows us to estimate shares of multinational ownership by 
both region and sector.  We thus start with the NOBUS information (our results by region and 
service sector are summarized in table A4 below).  
 
When we aggregate the NOBUS shares across regions or sectors, however, we find that the other 
three sources of information, show considerably higher foreign ownership shares than the 
NOBUS survey.  We believe that the NOBUS survey estimates are too small, and adjust them. 
The estimates of the service sectors institutes are lower than those from the BEEPS or Regions of 
Russia, and thus involve less adjustment of the NOBUS data. We employed least squares 
adjustment of the NOBUS data so that the weighted average over all of Russia in each sector is 
consistent with the national estimates we received from the specialist service sector research 
institutes in Russia. This process will give as a structure of ownership based on the NOBUS 
survey, with the economy-wide average by sector determined by the national data. The results are 
in table 12b. In this appendix we explain the details of how we obtained the and calculated the 
data.  
 
1.  Data 
 
We use three sources of data to calculate regional shares of output produced by multinational 
companies by regions and sectors, and we combine this with our national estimates from our 
Russian service sector experts. The regional data are: 
 
1.1  The National Survey of Household Welfare and Program Participation (NOBUS) that 
was implemented in 87 “oblasts” of the Russian Federation in 2003 by means of random 
sampling procedures. The survey was conducted on the basis of voluntary participation of 
selected households. The households that refused to participate in the survey were 
replaced by the households from the same voting district. Total number of households 
that agreed to participate in the survey is 44,529.   59
1.2  The Statistical handbook “Regions of Russia: Social and economic indicators: 2003” 
published by Roskomstat. The handbook contains the major economic and social 
statistical indicators for Russia since 1990 by economic region. 
1.3  Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2002 developed 
jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
BEEPS is a survey of managers and owners of 6,636 firms across the countries of Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Turkey.  
 
2.  Calculations 
2.1.  NOBUS. Respondents in the NOBUS survey report their wage income, the 
industry in which they work and whether the company is Russian owned, foreign 
owned or mixed ownership. For each region and industry we calculate the share 
of wage income earned in foreign or mixed ownership companies compared with 
the share of wage income earned in Russian companies. We take this wage share 
(in foreign plus mixed ownership companies) as a proxy for the share of output in 
each region and industry. Documentation of the details follows. 
2.1.1 Variables 
  First, we define a variable industry i based on the Question 17, Part C of the survey
24. We 
assign a three letter code according to the Table A1 
 
Table A1 Mapping of the survey Question 9, part C into IO table sector code 
Industry  Code IO table code  Question 9, Part C 
Agriculture & forestry and food  AGF  AGF, FOO  1,2 
Mining  MIN  FME NFM COA OLE  3 
Manufacturing  MNF  MWO TPP CNM CLO OTHT OIN  4 
Electric industry  ELE  ELE  5 
Construction CON  CON  6 
Trade TRD  TRD  7 
Catering CAT  CAT  8 
Communication and transport  COM  RLW TRK PIP MAR AIR TRO 
TMS PST 
9 
Financial services  FIN  FIN  10 
Communal & consumer services  PSM  PSM  15, 16 
Administration & public 
associations 
ADM ADM  12,  17 
Education & culture & art  ECM  ECM  13 
Science & science servicing  SCS  SCS  11 
Public health & sports & social 
security 
SSM SSM  14 
                                                      
24 Industries are encoded using a 2-digit code from the list of economic activity classification groups given 
in the Questionnaire form and based on National Classifier of Economic Activities OK 029-2001 
(OKVED).   60
  Second, we define a region code j as shown in the Table 2. 
  Third, we define a variable ownership based on the Question 9, Part C of the survey. For 
each respondent k who worked during the sample period
25, we define ownership as foreign if the 
respondent answered that she worked at the enterprise with mixed (both Russian and foreign) 
ownership, or with foreign ownership. Otherwise, we define ownership as local. 
  Finally, for each respondent k who worked during the sample period, we define a 
variable wage according to the respondent’s answer to the Question 13, Part C of the survey: 
what was your wage in rubles in the last 30 days? 
2.1.2 Aggregation 
All regions 
We replicate observations according to the weight kvzvijk that is assigned to each respondent and 










ijk ijk ij wage kvzv local *  
i is an industry code as defined in the second column of the Table 1 
j is a region as defined in the Table 2 
 







= _  
 
The results are presented in the Table A2. 
                                                      
25 A respondent worked during the investigated period if she answered “Yes” to the Question 1 or the 
Question 2, Part C of the survey.   61
Table A2 Share of foreign owned companies  
Region  ADM  AGF  CAT  COM*  CON  ECM  ELE FIN  MIN**  MNF***  PSM  SCS  SSM  TRD 
alt  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.13 
amu  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
arh  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ast  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.34  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
bel  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00 
bry  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
vla  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
vlg  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.13  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
vol  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00 
vor  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
msk  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.33  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.01 
spb  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.06  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.03 
eao  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
iva  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
irk  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kab  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
klg  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.24  0.00  0.00  0.03 
kal  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kam  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kar  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kem  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kir  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kos  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kdk  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
kra  0.00  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
krg  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
krs  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
len  0.00  0.10  0.24  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
lip  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
mag  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
mos  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
mur  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
niz  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00 
nov  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.00  0.54  0.00  0.00 
nvs  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00   62
Region  ADM  AGF  CAT  COM*  CON  ECM  ELE FIN  MIN**  MNF***  PSM  SCS  SSM  TRD 
oms  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ore  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
orl  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
pen  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
per  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
pri  0.00  0.19  0.31  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02 
psk  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14  0.17  0.00  0.00 
sev  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ady  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
alr  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
bas  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
bur  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
dag  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ing  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.23  0.00        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
klr  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
krl  0.00  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
kom  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
mar  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
mor  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
sah  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03 
tat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.00  0.03 
tyv  0.00  0.00     0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00     0.00  0.00 
hak  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00 
ros  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
rya  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
sam  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02 
sar  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
sao  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.01  0.11  0.00  0.00 
sve  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
smo  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00 
sta  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00 
tam  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
tve  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
tom  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
tul  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00     0.00  0.00 
tum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00   63
Region  ADM  AGF  CAT  COM*  CON  ECM  ELE FIN  MIN**  MNF***  PSM  SCS  SSM  TRD 
udm  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ulo  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
hab  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
chl  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.15  0.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
chi  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
chv  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
chu  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.51  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
yar  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
                                            
*  COM (communication and transport) includes RLW TRK PIP MAR AIR TRO TMS PST    
**  MIN(mining) includes FME NFM COA OLE                       
***  MNF (manufacturing) includes MWO TPP CNM CLO OTHT OIN              
Source: NOBUS 2003 
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10 bigger regions 
 
Table A3 presents shares of foreign owned enterprises for 10 bigger regions: Moscow, Saint 
Petersburg, Tumen, Northwest, North, Center, South, Ural, Siberia, and Far East regions. 














share foreign_  
where i is a region that belongs to a bigger region k. 
 
Table A3 Share of foreign owned companies for 10 regions 
   ADM  AGF  CAT  COM*  CON  ECM  ELE  FIN  MIN**  MNF***  PSM  SCS  SSM  TRD 
Moscow  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.101  0.222  0.000  0.000  0.025  0.000  0.009 
Saint 
Petersburgh  0.021  0.082  0.042  0.032  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.111  0.060  0.000  0.023  0.000  0.030 
Tumen  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.028  0.021  0.000  0.037  0.000  0.000 
Northwest  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.040  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.024  0.086  0.192  0.000  0.010 
North  0.006  0.115  0.000  0.003  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.025  0.044  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.004 
Center  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.005  0.000  0.005  0.003  0.000  0.026  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003 
South  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.023  0.006  0.013  0.000  0.023  0.024  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.000 
Urals  0.000  0.005  0.016  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.034  0.046  0.002  0.035  0.003  0.005 
Sibiria  0.000  0.001  0.069  0.000  0.010  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.021  0.141  0.000  0.013  0.000  0.013 
Far East  0.000  0.121  0.077  0.018  0.006  0.001  0.008  0.000  0.096  0.046  0.004  0.012  0.000  0.010 
                                            
*  COM (communication and transport) includes RLW TRK PIP MAR AIR TRO TMS PST    
**  MIN(mining) includes FME NFM COA OLE                       
***  MNF (manufacturing) includes MWO TPP CNM CLO OTHT OIN              
 
2.2  Regions of Russia 2003  
 
  Table 3.5 of “Regions of Russia 2003” reports the distribution of labor force by regions 
and types of ownership in 2002. The types of ownership include state, city, private, NGO, mixed 
Russian
26, and foreign
27 ownership. Unfortunately, the handbook does not have the sectoral 
distribution of labor by the types of ownership within a region. Therefore, we can calculate only 
the regional distribution of workers.  
                                                      
26 Any mix of state, city, private, and NGO ownership 
27 Includes both fully and partially foreign ownership   65






share foreign = _  
 
where j is a region as defined in the Table 2 
foreignj is a number of workers in foreign owned companies in the region j 
totalj is a total number of workers in the region j 
 
Results are presented in the Table A4: 
 
Table A4 Distribution of labor force by type of ownership  
Share of workers by type of ownership 
Code  Region 
State  City  Private  NGO  Mixed 
Russian  Foreign
rus  Russian Federation  0.21  0.16  0.50  0.01  0.09  0.03 
cen  Central Federal Okrug  0.20  0.15  0.51  0.01  0.09  0.04 
bel  Belgorodskaya  0.13  0.19  0.61  0.01  0.06  0.01 
bry  Bryanskaya  0.19  0.17  0.56  0.01  0.07  0.01 
vla  Vladimirskaya  0.17  0.17  0.53  0.01  0.09  0.03 
vor  Voronezhskaya  0.20  0.15  0.58  0.01  0.06  0.01 
iva  Ivanovskaya  0.22  0.15  0.52  0.02  0.08  0.02 
kal  Kaluzhskaya  0.22  0.15  0.51  0.01  0.07  0.03 
kos  Kostromskaya  0.21  0.21  0.49  0.01  0.07  0.01 
krs  Kurskaya     0.22  0.11  0.58  0.01  0.07  0.02 
lip  Lipetskaya  0.15  0.18  0.47  0.01  0.07  0.12 
mos  Moskovskaya  0.22  0.18  0.47  0.01  0.09  0.03 
orl  Orlovskaya  0.21  0.13  0.48  0.01  0.14  0.02 
rya  Ryazanskaya  0.17  0.17  0.56  0.01  0.07  0.02 
smo  Smolenskaya  0.22  0.18  0.51  0.01  0.07  0.01 
tam  Tambovskaya  0.20  0.18  0.55  0.01  0.04  0.02 
tve  Tverskaya     0.20  0.17  0.51  0.01  0.09  0.01 
tul  Tulskaya     0.16  0.16  0.45  0.01  0.16  0.06 
yar  Yaroslavskaya  0.16  0.18  0.48  0.01  0.15  0.03 
msk  Moscow city  0.22  0.11  0.51  0.01  0.11  0.06 
nor  North West Federal Okrug  0.26  0.13  0.49  0.01  0.07  0.05 
krl  The Republic of Karelia  0.24  0.21  0.39  0.01  0.10  0.05 
kom  The Republic of Komi  0.21  0.22  0.39  0.00  0.13  0.05 
arh  Arkhangelskaya  0.29  0.21  0.38  0.00  0.06  0.06 
nao  Nenetskiy AO  0.27  0.19  0.45  0.00  0.03  0.06 
vol  Vologodskaya  0.15  0.19  0.49  0.00  0.14  0.03 
klg  Kaliningradskaya  0.24  0.16  0.50  0.01  0.06  0.03 
len  Leningradskaya  0.17  0.18  0.54  0.00  0.05  0.06 
mur  Murmanskaya  0.30  0.20  0.38  0.00  0.10  0.02 
nov  Novgorodskaya  0.19  0.21  0.45  0.01  0.09  0.06 
psk  Pskovskaya  0.22  0.18  0.54  0.01  0.03  0.02 
spb  Saint Petersburg city  0.34  0.00  0.55  0.01  0.05  0.05 
sou  South Federal Okrug  0.18  0.15  0.57  0.01  0.07  0.01 
ady  The Republic of Adygeya  0.21  0.18  0.53  0.01  0.06  0.00   66
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Code  Region 
State  City  Private  NGO  Mixed 
Russian  Foreign
dag  The Republic of Dagestan  0.25  0.15  0.55  0.01  0.04  0.01 
ing  The Republic of Ingushetia  0.34  0.15  0.49  0.01  0.02  0.01 
kab  Kabardino Balkaria  0.19  0.19  0.49  0.01  0.11  0.00 
klr  The Republic of Kalmykia  0.28  0.22  0.43  0.01  0.07  0.00 
kar  Karachaevo Cherkessia  0.30  0.09  0.57  0.01  0.04  0.00 
sev  North Osetia  0.30  0.18  0.45  0.01  0.06  0.01 
cher  The Chechen Republic  …  …  …  …  …  … 
kdk  Krasnodarsky krai  0.15  0.17  0.58  0.01  0.08  0.01 
sta  Stavropolsky krai  0.22  0.09  0.59  0.01  0.05  0.04 
ast  Astrakhanskaya  0.23  0.19  0.46  0.01  0.06  0.05 
vlg  Volgogradskaya  0.15  0.18  0.59  0.01  0.07  0.01 
ros  Rostovskaya  0.15  0.15  0.59  0.01  0.09  0.01 
pvl  Provlzhsky Federal Okrug  0.21  0.16  0.48  0.01  0.13  0.02 
bas  Bashkortostan  0.19  0.22  0.37  0.01  0.22  0.00 
mar  The Republic of Mari El  0.23  0.19  0.44  0.01  0.12  0.01 
mor  The Republic of Mordovia  0.25  0.16  0.40  0.01  0.17  0.00 
tat  The Republic of Tatarstan  0.35  0.05  0.38  0.01  0.16  0.05 
udm  The Republic of Udmurtia  0.21  0.18  0.45  0.01  0.14  0.01 
chv  The Republic of Chuvashia  0.16  0.17  0.49  0.02  0.14  0.02 
kir  Kirovskaya  0.22  0.16  0.48  0.01  0.10  0.03 
niz  Nizhegorodskaya  0.17  0.17  0.55  0.01  0.08  0.02 
ore  Orenburgskaya  0.16  0.19  0.54  0.00  0.11  0.01 
pen  Penzenskaya  0.26  0.11  0.55  0.01  0.06  0.00 
per  Permskaya  0.17  0.18  0.51  0.01  0.09  0.03 
kpao  Komi-Perm AO  0.28  0.15  0.49  0.00  0.07  0.01 
sam  Samarskaya  0.14  0.16  0.51  0.01  0.15  0.03 
sar  Saratovskaya  0.21  0.16  0.55  0.01  0.04  0.02 
ulo  Ulyanovskaya  0.21  0.17  0.41  0.01  0.19  0.01 
ura  Urals Federal Okrug  0.18  0.19  0.49  0.01  0.08  0.06 
krg  Kurganskaya  0.19  0.18  0.56  0.01  0.05  0.01 
sve  Sverdlovskaya  0.21  0.18  0.40  0.01  0.07  0.12 
tum  Tumenskaya  0.12  0.20  0.58  0.00  0.09  0.01 
hmao  Hanty-Mansi AO  0.08  0.21  0.60  0.00  0.09  0.01 
ynao  Yamal-Nenets AO  0.09  0.22  0.55  0.00  0.12  0.01 
chl  Chelyabinskaya  0.19  0.19  0.46  0.01  0.09  0.07 
sib  Siberia Federal Okrug  0.22  0.19  0.48  0.01  0.08  0.02 
alr  Altay republic  0.28  0.23  0.45  0.01  0.03  0.00 
bur  The Republic of Buryatia  0.25  0.22  0.41  0.02  0.06  0.04 
tyv  The Republic of Tyva  0.34  0.32  0.30  0.00  0.04  0.00 
hak  The Republic of Khakasia  0.23  0.16  0.51  0.01  0.07  0.04 
alt  Altaisky krai  0.18  0.20  0.54  0.01  0.05  0.02 
kra  Krasnoyarsky krai  0.21  0.20  0.42  0.00  0.11  0.06 
tao  Tajmyr AO  0.36  0.17  0.43  0.00  0.03  0.00 
evao  Evenkskiy AO  0.49  0.21  0.20  0.00  0.11  … 
irk  Irkutskaya  0.21  0.20  0.46  0.00  0.10  0.02 
uoao  Ust-Ordyn Buryat AO  0.15  0.25  0.52  0.00  0.07  0.00 
kem  Kemerovskaya  0.16  0.22  0.50  0.00  0.11  0.00 
nvs  Novosibirskaya  0.28  0.15  0.48  0.01  0.07  0.01 
oms  Omskaya     0.19  0.17  0.56  0.01  0.07  0.01 
tom  Tomskaya  0.23  0.18  0.49  0.00  0.08  0.01 
chi  Chitinskaya  0.33  0.19  0.38  0.01  0.07  0.02 
abao  Aginsk Buryat AO  0.35  0.07  0.54  0.01  0.02  0.01 
far  Far East Federal Okrug  0.29  0.15  0.42  0.00  0.11  0.02 
sah  The Republic of Sakha  0.52  0.01  0.28  0.00  0.18  0.00 
pri  Primorsky krai  0.23  0.16  0.47  0.01  0.11  0.03 
hab  Khabarovsky krai  0.29  0.18  0.38  0.00  0.11  0.03   67
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amu  Amurskaya  0.26  0.17  0.47  0.00  0.08  0.01 
kam  Kamchatskaya  0.28  0.18  0.46  0.00  0.07  0.00 
koao  Koryak AO  0.29  0.27  0.38  0.00  0.06  0.00 
mag  Magadanskaya  0.23  0.21  0.46  0.00  0.08  0.02 
sao  Sakhalinskaya  0.19  0.19  0.52  0.01  0.07  0.02 
eao  Jewish AO  0.31  0.21  0.40  0.00  0.07  0.01 
chu  Chukotsky AO  0.47  0.23  0.18  0.00  0.11  0.02 
Source: Regions of Russia 2003 
 
Distribution of labor force by type of ownership for 10 bigger regions 
Table A5 presents shares of total regional labor force employed by state, city, local private 
company, non-government, mixed Russian, and foreign organizations for 10 bigger regions: 
Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Tumen, Northwest, North, Center, South, Ural, Siberia, and Far East 

















where i is on of the 89 regions of Russia that belongs to a bigger regional markets k, and j is a 
type of ownership. 
 
Table A5 Distribution of labor force by type of ownership. Ten bigger regions  
Share of workers by type of ownership 
Code  Market 
State  City  Private  NGO  Mixed Russian  Foreign
Msc  Moscow  0.22  0.13  0.49  0.01  0.10  0.05 
Stp  Saint Petersburgh  0.30  0.04  0.54  0.01  0.05  0.05 
Tmn  Tumen Region  0.12  0.20  0.58  0.00  0.09  0.01 
Vgd  Northwest  0.19  0.19  0.50  0.01  0.09  0.03 
Nor  North   0.26  0.21  0.38  0.00  0.09  0.05 
Cen  Center  0.19  0.16  0.53  0.01  0.09  0.03 
Sou  South   0.19  0.16  0.56  0.01  0.07  0.02 
Url  Ural   0.21  0.16  0.46  0.01  0.12  0.04 
Sib  Siberia   0.23  0.18  0.47  0.01  0.09  0.02 
Far  Far East   0.26  0.18  0.44  0.01  0.10  0.02 
Source: Regions of Russia 2003   68
2.3 BEEPS 
2.3.1  Variables 
 
We define a variable workersijk as a number of permanent, full time employees that a firm k in 
industry i from country j had in 2002 (Question 91a1 of the survey). 
We define an industry i according to the firm’s main area of activity in terms of sales (Question 
S.3) 
Finally, we define a variable ownership that takes two values: foreign and local. A company k is 
the foreign owned company if at least 10% of the company is owned by a private foreign 
company or organization (Question S.4c). 
 
2.3.2  Country Aggregation 
 










ijk ij s wor local ker  
 







= _  
 
The results are presented in the Table A6. 
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  Sector 







Country                   
            
Albania  1.00a 0.11 0.18 0.36 0.10
  0.00b 0.32  0.39  0.50  0.30 
   2c 19  62  14  42 
            
Armenia  0.33 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.17
  0.58 0.00  0.39  0.32  0.38 
   3 11  64  10  47 
            
Azerbaijan  0.00 0.11 0.24 0.40 0.09
  0.00 0.32  0.43  0.52  0.29 
   3 27  49  10  57 
            
Belarus  . 0.07 0.38 0.40 0.18
  . 0.26  0.49  0.50  0.38 
   0 68  42  25  80 
            
BiH  0.00 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.18
  0.00 0.00  0.31  0.39  0.39 
   3 12  67  12  56 
            
Bulgaria  0.33 0.00 0.24 0.16 0.17
  0.58 0.00  0.43  0.37  0.38 
   3 19  49  25  93 
            
Croatia  0.33 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.31
  0.58 0.29  0.35  0.26  0.47 
   3 23  37  15  58 
              70
Czech  0.00 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.12
  0.00 0.38  0.41  0.36  0.33 
   3 40  68  21  67 
            
Estonia  0.00 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.21
  0.00 0.37  0.38  0.34  0.41 
   3 20  30  16  48 
            
FYROM  0.00 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.19
  0.00 0.00  0.29  0.36  0.40 
   2 13  45  14  62 
            
Georgia  1.00 0.30 0.15 0.18 0.12
  0.00 0.48  0.36  0.39  0.33 
   1 10  34  17  58 
            
Hungary  0.00 0.11 0.55 0.25 0.13
  0.00 0.32  0.50  0.45  0.33 
   4 36  51  16  79 
            
Kazakhstan  0.17 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.16
  0.41 0.24  0.43  0.26  0.37 
   6 48  54  15  69 
            
Kyrgyzstan  0.25 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.13
  0.50 0.30  0.43  0.39  0.34 
   4 21  49  12  52 
            
Latvia  . 0.17 0.50 0.21 0.08
  . 0.39  0.51  0.43  0.27 
   0 12  28  14  80 
            
Lithuania  0.00 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.21
  0.00 0.19  0.36  0.34  0.41 
   3 28  40  24  48 
            
Moldova  . 0.00 0.34 0.18 0.07  71
  . 0.00  0.48  0.40  0.25 
   0 5 50  11  74 
            
Poland  . 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.20
  . 0.31  0.36  0.38  0.40 
   0 76 114  54  168 
            
Romania  . 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.12
  . 0.38  0.41  0.44  0.32 
   0 24  82  20  68 
            
Russia  0.29 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.16
  0.49 0.27  0.38  0.43  0.36 
   7 80 128  37  135 
            
Slovakia  . 0.18 0.17 0.40 0.22
  . 0.39  0.38  0.51  0.42 
   0 17  29  15  46 
            
Slovenia  0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.15
  0.00 0.00  0.49  0.00  0.36 
   3 28  47  16  40 
            
Tajikistan  0.20 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.00
  0.45 0.00  0.31  0.39  0.00 
   5 20  48  12  47 
            
Turkey  0.00 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.10
  0.00 0.17  0.37  0.42  0.30 
   8 33 151  28  165 
            
Ukraine  0.00 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.27
  0.00 0.19  0.36  0.35  0.45 
   2 57 139  29  114 
            
Uzbekistan  0.00 0.02 0.39 0.16 0.18
  0.00 0.16  0.49  0.37  0.39   72
   5 41  51  19  92 
            
Yugoslavia  0.00 0.06 0.12 0.23 0.27
  0.00 0.24  0.32  0.43  0.45 
   4 18  68  22  73 
                    
Total by 
sector  0.14 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.16
  0.35 0.27  0.41  0.40  0.37 
   77 806 1676  523  2018 































































































































































a  0.11  0.18 0.36 0.10 0.11 0.08  0.00 0.15
   0.00
b  0.32  0.39  0.50  0.30  0.33  0.28  0.00  0.36 
   2
c  19  62  14  42  9  13  9  170 
Armenia  0.33  0.00  0.19 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.25  0.00 0.16
   0.58  0.00  0.39  0.32  0.38  0.32  0.45  0.00  0.37 
   3  11  64  10  47  10  16  10  171 
Azerbaijan  0.00  0.11  0.24 0.40 0.09 0.13 0.22  0.00 0.16
   0.00  0.32  0.43  0.52  0.29  0.35  0.44  0.00  0.37 
   3  27  49  10  57  8  9  6  169 
Belarus  .  0.07  0.38 0.40 0.18 0.13 0.20  0.07 0.20
   .  0.26  0.49  0.50  0.38  0.35  0.45  0.26  0.40 
   0  68  42  25  80  15  5  15  250 
BiH  0.00  0.00  0.10 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.07  0.13 0.13
   0.00  0.00  0.31  0.39  0.39  0.49  0.26  0.35  0.33 
   3  12  67  12  56  7  15  8  180 
Bulgaria  0.33  0.00  0.24 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.10  0.06 0.16
   0.58  0.00  0.43  0.37  0.38  0.39  0.30  0.24  0.37 
   3  19  49  25  93  22  21  17  249 
Croatia  0.33  0.09  0.14 0.07 0.31 0.18 0.10  0.00 0.18
   0.58  0.29  0.35  0.26  0.47  0.39  0.32  0.00  0.38 
   3  23  37  15  58  28  10  10  184 
Czech  0.00  0.18  0.21 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.13  0.17 0.16
   0.00  0.38  0.41  0.36  0.33  0.37  0.34  0.39  0.37 
   3  40  68  21  67  32  23  12  266 
Estonia  0.00  0.15  0.17 0.13 0.21 0.25 0.07  0.22 0.18





























































































































































   3  20  30  16  48  28  15  9  169 
FYROM  0.00  0.00  0.09 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.14  0.17 0.13
   0.00  0.00  0.29  0.36  0.40  0.30  0.36  0.41  0.34 
   2  13  45  14  62  11  14  6  167 
Georgia  1.00  0.30  0.15 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.17  0.09 0.15
   0.00  0.48  0.36  0.39  0.33  0.37  0.39  0.29  0.36 
   1  10  34  17  58  19  12  23  174 
Hungary  0.00  0.11  0.55 0.25 0.13 0.27 0.20  0.06 0.23
   0.00  0.32  0.50  0.45  0.33  0.45  0.41  0.24  0.42 
   4  36  51  16  79  30  15  17  248 
Kazakhstan  0.17  0.06  0.24 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.18  0.10 0.15
   0.41  0.24  0.43  0.26  0.37  0.35  0.40  0.32  0.36 
   6  48  54  15  69  37  11  10  250 
Kyrgyzstan  0.25  0.10  0.24 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.50  0.09 0.17
   0.50  0.30  0.43  0.39  0.34  0.00  0.53  0.30  0.38 
   4  21  49  12  52  14  8  11  171 
Latvia  .  0.17  0.50 0.21 0.08 0.12 0.00  0.00 0.16
   .  0.39  0.51  0.43  0.27  0.33  0.00  0.00  0.37 
   0  12  28  14  80  25  9  7  175 
Lithuania  0.00  0.04  0.15 0.13 0.21 0.09 0.27  0.33 0.16
   0.00  0.19  0.36  0.34  0.41  0.29  0.45  0.52  0.36 
   3  28  40  24  48  23  26  6  198 
Moldova  .  0.00  0.34 0.18 0.07 0.67 0.00  0.14 0.17
   .  0.00  0.48  0.40  0.25  0.58  0.00  0.35  0.37 
   0  5  50  11  74  3  9  22  174 
Poland  .  0.11  0.15 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.21  0.04 0.15
   .  0.31  0.36  0.38  0.40  0.34  0.43  0.20  0.36 
   0  76  114  54  168  47  14  25  498 
Romania  .  0.17  0.21 0.25 0.12 0.27 0.12  0.11 0.18
   .  0.38  0.41  0.44  0.32  0.45  0.33  0.32  0.38 
   0  24  82  20  68  26  17  18  255 
Russia  0.29  0.08  0.17 0.24 0.16 0.23 0.21  0.12 0.16
   0.49  0.27  0.38  0.43  0.36  0.42  0.42  0.33  0.37 
   7  80  128  37  135  40  19  58  504 
Slovakia  .  0.18  0.17 0.40 0.22 0.11 0.00  0.17 0.18
   .  0.39  0.38  0.51  0.42  0.31  0.00  0.39  0.38 
   0  17  29  15  46  38  12  12  169 
Slovenia  0.00  0.00  0.36 0.00 0.15 0.12 0.07  0.00 0.15
   0.00  0.00  0.49  0.00  0.36  0.33  0.26  0.00  0.36 
   3  28  47  16  40  33  15  6  188 
Tajikistan  0.20  0.00  0.10 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.05





























































































































































   5  20  48  12  47  18  10  14  174 
Turkey  0.00  0.03  0.17 0.21 0.10 0.26 0.07  0.05 0.12
   0.00  0.17  0.37  0.42  0.30  0.45  0.25  0.21  0.33 
   8  33  151  28  165  34  73  22  514 
Ukraine  0.00  0.04  0.15 0.14 0.27 0.22 0.21  0.03 0.17
   0.00  0.19  0.36  0.35  0.45  0.41  0.42  0.19  0.38 
   2  57  139  29  114  65  28  29  463 
Uzbekistan  0.00  0.02  0.39 0.16 0.18 0.04 0.12  0.10 0.17
   0.00  0.16  0.49  0.37  0.39  0.20  0.33  0.32  0.38 
   5  41  51  19  92  25  17  10  260 
Yugoslavia  0.00  0.06  0.12 0.23 0.27 0.15 0.17  0.06 0.17
   0.00  0.24  0.32  0.43  0.45  0.37  0.38  0.24  0.38 
   4  18  68  22  73  26  18  17  246 
Total by 
sector  0.14  0.08  0.21 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.14  0.08 0.16
   0.35  0.27  0.41  0.40  0.37  0.37  0.34  0.28  0.37 
   77  806  1676  523  2018  673  454  409  6636 
Notes:  a Share of employed by a company with at least 10% of foreign ownership       
   b Standard deviation                
   c Number of observations             
Source: BEEPS 2002 
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Appendix B 
Investment Ratings of the Regions of Russia 
 
  To assess the investment climate and barriers to foreign direct investment, we use “The 
Rating of Investment Climate of Russia’s Regions in 2002-2003” published by Expert Rating 
Agency (Expert RA). Expert RA is a rating agency founded by Expert Magazine that has 
published its “Investment Rating of Russia’s Regions” every year since 1996. The evaluation of 
the investment climate is carried out for each of the 89 regions of Russia based on more than a 
hundred statistical indicators of regional development from various sources that include Rosstat, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Development, and The Central Bank. 
 
  The rating of investment climate is formed based on two primary measures: investment 
risk and investment potential of each region. The aggregate measure of investment risk is 
calculated based on the seven types of risks: legal, political, economic, financial, social, criminal, 
and ecological risks. The rating of a region by each type of risks is defined based on the index of 
risk calculated as the deviation from the all-Russia average level of risk that is set equal to 1 and 
aggregated to the overall index of risk An investment potential of a region is derived based on 
the eight regional indicators of economic potential in the following categories: labor, consumer 
demand, production, financial potential, institutional quality, innovations, infrastructure, and 
natural resources. The region’s potential rating in each category is calculated according to the 
regional share in that category. The overall rating of investment potential is derived as a weighted 
average of investment potential in each category. For our sensitivity analysis, we chose the 
“investment potential rankings.” 
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Novgorodskaya 1 0.861 3 44 9 20 7 39 19
Yaroslavskaya 2 0.871 1 74 48 22 2 45 50
Saint Petersburg city 3 0.872 52 76 6 2 3 40 44
Belgorodskaya 4 0.876 58 26 14 24 4 16 11
Orlovskaya 5 0.885 24 6 15 23 8 33 74
The Republic of 
Tatarstan 6 0.886 64 2 23 27 17 43 40
Vologodskaya 7 0.897 30 23 16 10 6 41 70
Moskovskaya 8 0.902 9 28 8 14 40 24 43
Nizhegorodskaya 9 0.907 2 72 52 16 9 29 18
The Republic of 
Bashkortostan 10 0.923 4 7 3 35 38 63 42
The Republic of 
Mordovia 11 0.924 49 1 49 47 42 14 23
Rostovskaya 12 0.944 44 21 4 31 25 46 21
Lipetskaya 13 0.949 42 55 21 25 5 5 73
Permskaya 14 0.953 10 35 26 11 11 69 67
Moscow city 15 0.959 76 34 1 1 1 85 26
Tomskaya 16 0.976 7 40 7 3 37 77 54
Leningradskaya 17 0.977 11 58 10 9 50 26 72
Kaluzhskaya 18 0.979 26 36 20 18 13 47 71
Krasnodarsky krai 19 0.986 8 24 12 26 35 67 56
The Republic of 
Chuvashia 20 0.988 18 46 64 33 27 23 8
Samarskaya 21 0.992 28 63 36 8 18 66 60
Kaliningradskaya 22 0.992 45 68 29 6 12 72 36
Saratovskaya 23 1.022 53 13 35 63 26 20 39
Tverskaya 24 1.023 34 48 67 53 20 25 3
Voronezhskaya 25 1.037 17 67 56 50 28 27 33
Nenetskiy AO 26 1.04 75 11 2 4 58 8 83
Arkhangelskaya 27 1.049 16 27 33 38 49 18 76
Penzenskaya 28 1.055 15 30 74 67 36 1 29
Smolenskaya 29 1.058 38 62 45 51 10 55 45
Ryazanskaya 30 1.06 70 57 58 49 15 7 66
The Republic of 
Khakasia 31 1.06 6 56 24 30 54 59 49
The Republic of 
Adygeya 32 1.062 29 10 79 60 53 12 6
Kirovskaya 33 1.066 5 49 72 58 48 13 31
Murmanskaya 34 1.073 51 22 39 48 19 42 79
Kemerovskaya 35 1.078 27 33 25 55 16 52 78
Kostromskaya 36 1.078 48 53 66 59 34 17 28
Volgogradskaya 37 1.095 59 79 51 15 32 61 41
Orenburgskaya 38 1.105 22 60 42 28 55 56 57
Yamal-Nenets AO 39 1.11 25 5 17 7 44 53 88
Hanty-Mansi AO 40 1.113 61 9 5 5 14 79 87
Stavropolsky krai 41 1.113 36 78 18 57 23 70 15
The Republic of 
Buryatia 42 1.117 12 32 13 61 62 54 48








Seven components of investment risk















The Republic of 
Udmurtia 44 1.121 57 19 65 17 76 30 53
Khabarovsky krai 45 1.123 13 37 38 37 24 82 68
Pskovskaya 46 1.127 39 52 34 34 80 34 13
The Republic of Karelia
47 1.129 55 43 30 39 57 50 65
Tambovskaya 48 1.136 21 41 60 69 47 19 55
The Republic of Sakha
49 1.147 47 12 75 42 75 15 64
Kurskaya 50 1.148 78 61 61 52 43 32 32
Omskaya 51 1.157 63 45 44 19 65 73 51
Sverdlovskaya 52 1.162 74 47 19 21 67 57 69
Amurskaya 53 1.168 46 69 46 68 22 65 52
Astrakhanskaya 54 1.17 33 65 31 12 79 75 34
Tumenskaya 55 1.183 41 18 11 46 30 86 62
Ulyanovskaya 56 1.187 77 50 59 64 51 31 12
Krasnoyarsky krai 57 1.194 19 77 41 40 39 58 81
Vladimirskaya 58 1.196 54 71 40 45 83 28 7
Chelyabinskaya 59 1.196 62 42 37 41 31 44 86
Altay republic 60 1.198 69 39 28 70 63 49 27
Tulskaya 61 1.199 43 85 47 43 46 11 82
Irkutskaya 62 1.209 66 73 27 44 33 76 77
Aginsk Buryat AO 63 1.225 89 4 68 73 73 4 24
Novosibirskaya 64 1.231 14 16 32 29 82 83 30
Primorsky krai 65 1.242 65 83 53 32 41 80 59
Bryanskaya 66 1.255 23 66 76 65 21 36 85
Chitinskaya 67 1.263 37 31 81 62 52 71 61
Kurganskaya 68 1.271 68 54 71 66 68 64 14
The Republic of Mari El
69 1.329 32 81 80 78 59 35 10
The Republic of 
Kabardino Balkaria 70 1.332 60 82 43 84 64 6 5
Sakhalinskaya 71 1.341 79 80 22 56 81 68 46
Komi-Perm AO 72 1.342 67 25 69 85 61 9 9
Ivanovskaya 73 1.38 31 64 73 71 87 37 17
Altaisky krai 74 1.387 35 84 54 75 84 51 47
The Republic of Komi 75 1.419 72 59 50 54 74 78 84
Jewish AO 76 1.419 56 20 82 81 29 84 38
Evenkskiy AO 77 1.435 81 15 86 74 78 3 58
The Republic of 
Kalmykia 78 1.448 50 38 88 76 71 48 20
The Republic of North 
Osetia 79 1.449 20 70 55 80 45 87 22
Tajmyr AO 80 1.474 89 17 78 36 60 10 89
Magadanskaya 81 1.525 80 51 83 72 85 62 63
Kamchatskaya 82 1.563 83 75 84 79 66 74 37








Seven components of investment risk
















The Republic of 
Karachaevo Cherkessia 84 1.621 89 86 57 83 69 38 16
The Republic of 
Dagestan 85 1.625 40 87 63 82 70 60 4
Ust-Ordyn Buryat AO 86 1.644 82 29 85 88 72 2 1
The Republic of 
Ingushetia 87 2.493 89 88 77 87 86 88 2
Koryak AO 88 2.861 73 14 87 77 89 21 75
The Chechen Republic






























Novgorodskaya 65 0.433 66 65 56 64 57 48 30 79
Yaroslavskaya 33 0.803 31 34 33 35 26 25 27 80
Saint Petersburg 
city 2 6.572 2 3 5 4 2 3 1 89
Belgorodskaya 25 1.105 36 31 27 41 36 41 9 9
Orlovskaya 58 0.516 55 56 57 57 62 38 21 76
The Republic of 
Tatarstan 9 2.049 10 9 7 8 7 10 35 34
Vologodskaya 39 0.73 46 35 19 27 39 39 63 62
Moskovskaya 3 4.511 3 2 3 3 3 2 4 48
Nizhegorodskaya 6 2.239 6 10 15 15 9 4 33 57
The Republic of 
Bashkortostan 15 1.822 12 8 10 6 18 14 47 25
The Republic of 
Mordovia 62 0.452 53 68 55 60 69 47 34 66
Rostovskaya 12 1.969 5 7 16 12 6 11 13 29
Lipetskaya 38 0.74 47 38 21 31 53 65 14 73
Permskaya 11 1.97 22 14 14 11 16 12 58 5
Moscow city 1 17.781 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 89
Tomskaya 45 0.681 48 37 37 33 41 22 70 28
Leningradskaya 21 1.228 29 36 18 32 23 6 5 52
Kaluzhskaya 40 0.726 40 55 48 55 44 15 17 71
Krasnodarsky krai 10 2.017 4 5 12 9 5 27 6 30
The Republic of 









Eight components of investment potential
Region
 

















Samarskaya 8 2.16 7 6 6 10 8 7 20 45
Kaliningradskaya 37 0.741 52 58 53 52 29 54 3 40
Saratovskaya 20 1.262 9 21 23 21 19 19 23 35
Tverskaya 44 0.682 37 48 41 47 33 29 26 63
Voronezhskaya 28 1.032 23 22 29 30 28 16 18 55
Nenetskiy AO 85 0.091 86 83 74 78 81 83 86 69
Arkhangelskaya 43 0.685 41 33 43 39 42 46 66 19
Penzenskaya 49 0.628 27 46 51 51 55 35 39 49
Smolenskaya 54 0.565 51 47 45 56 56 57 15 74
Ryazanskaya 48 0.628 42 49 40 45 46 42 22 56
The Republic of 
Khakasia 73 0.31 71 70 69 71 71 75 67 27
The Republic of 
Adygeya 75 0.254 75 73 76 76 73 79 25 86
Kirovskaya 55 0.56 34 45 44 42 47 51 64 53
Murmanskaya 32 0.926 43 40 38 36 37 30 31 13
Kemerovskaya 13 1.95 16 11 13 16 24 26 57 4
Kostromskaya 69 0.344 68 69 64 69 65 49 59 72
Volgogradskaya 22 1.175 19 16 20 17 22 20 43 32
Orenburgskaya 30 0.957 24 27 22 29 35 55 44 18
Yamal-Nenets AO 16 1.682 67 41 9 13 25 73 80 2
Hanty-Mansi AO 5 2.554 26 15 2 2 27 37 81 6
Stavropolsky krai 27 1.035 14 19 31 24 20 32 51 41
The Republic of 
Buryatia 57 0.521 57 54 62 58 61 66 74 15
Chukotsky AO 70 0.339 81 81 77 73 82 81 78 14
The Republic of 
Udmurtia 41 0.725 32 39 28 37 30 40 41 60
Khabarovsky krai 23 1.143 20 29 25 22 34 34 61 10
Pskovskaya 63 0.443 59 62 67 67 63 68 12 77
The Republic of 
Karelia 60 0.473 65 57 54 61 54 62 36 36
Tambovskaya 59 0.515 49 44 58 54 64 43 32 67
The Republic of 
Sakha 19 1.372 64 32 26 23 43 44 85 1
Kurskaya 35 0.766 45 51 42 49 51 53 7 21
Omskaya 31 0.937 25 20 34 20 21 21 53 43
Sverdlovskaya 4 2.771 8 4 4 5 4 5 48 8
Amurskaya 50 0.617 56 61 60 62 66 71 65 12
Astrakhanskaya 56 0.536 60 52 59 44 52 59 46 26
Tumenskaya 34 0.801 38 25 50 28 11 23 62 51










Eight components of investment potential
 

















Krasnoyarsky krai 7 2.175 13 13 11 7 14 17 75 3
Vladimirskaya 36 0.75 30 50 39 43 32 24 16 70
Chelyabinskaya 14 1.886 11 12 8 14 12 9 24 24
Altay republic 83 0.126 78 79 82 80 78 80 72 50
Tulskaya 29 0.977 33 30 30 38 31 13 8 61
Irkutskaya 17 1.551 17 18 17 18 17 31 73 7
Aginsk Buryat AO 88 0.052 84 84 87 84 88 82 83 85
Novosibirskaya 18 1.373 15 17 24 19 13 8 50 37
Primorsky krai 24 1.126 18 24 35 25 10 33 45 17
Bryanskaya 47 0.644 28 43 52 48 50 50 10 68
Chitinskaya 51 0.616 63 63 66 59 60 64 69 11
Kurganskaya 67 0.421 62 60 65 63 59 45 49 65
The Republic of 
Mari El 71 0.32 70 71 70 72 67 61 54 44
The Republic of 
Kabardino Balkaria 68 0.403 61 59 68 65 72 69 28 47
Sakhalinskaya 61 0.472 69 64 49 46 40 56 55 39
Komi-Perm AO 87 0.061 82 82 85 85 83 77 84 82
Ivanovskaya 66 0.426 44 67 63 66 58 60 37 84
Altaisky krai 26 1.037 21 23 32 34 15 28 52 23
The Republic of 
Komi 42 0.69 54 28 36 26 45 52 79 22
Jewish AO 78 0.19 80 77 78 81 77 74 60 38
Evenkskiy AO 84 0.094 87 88 88 89 89 89 89 31
The Republic of 
Kalmykia 82 0.138 76 78 80 74 76 76 76 64
The Republic of 
North Osetia 64 0.435 58 66 72 68 70 70 11 58
Tajmyr AO 77 0.235 85 85 86 83 85 85 71 16
Magadanskaya 72 0.311 74 75 73 75 74 72 82 20
Kamchatskaya 74 0.269 73 72 71 70 68 58 68 42
The Republic of 
Tyva 81 0.138 79 76 81 79 79 78 88 33
The Republic of 
Karachaevo 
Cherkessia 76 0.239 72 74 75 77 75 67 56 59
The Republic of 
Dagestan 53 0.613 35 26 61 40 38 63 40 46
Ust-Ordyn Buryat 
AO 86 0.066 83 86 84 87 84 89 77 81
The Republic of 
Ingushetia 79 0.177 77 80 83 82 80 84 38 87
Koryak AO 89 0.047 88 87 79 86 86 89 87 78
The Chechen 
Republic 80 0.155 89 89 89 88 87 89 29 75
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Appendix C 
Key Elements of the GAMS code for creating the 
Regional Input-Output Tables 
 




  y(g,r)    Regional shares of output (imputed), 
  rtm(mrg,g,r)  Regional shares of margin provision, 
 
 cd(r)    Region shares of final consumption, 
 id(r)    Regional shares of investment 
 gd(r)    Regional shares of government demand; 
 
*  Define shares of industrial and energy output based on 
*  economic indicators and industrial share statistics from  
*  the Regions of Russia.  Notice that this covers industrial  
*  goods, fuels, refined products and agricultural output: 
 
y.fx(g,r)$indsec(g) = indic(r,"Indus")*indshare(r,g) / 
       sum(rr,indic(rr,"Indus")*indshare(rr,g)); 
 
y.fx(fuel,r) = regfuel(r,fuel); 
y.fx("oil",r) = oil(r,"oil")/sum(rr,oil(rr,"oil")); 
 
y.fx("agr",r) = indic(r,"totagr")  / sum(rr, indic(rr,"totagr")); 
 
*  Use "Commissioning of total living area" to allocate  
* construction: 
 
y.fx("con",r) = indic(r,"housing") / sum(rr, 
indic(rr,"housing"));   82
 
*  Use industrial output to allocate other goods and services: 
 
y.fx("oth",r) = indic(r,"indus")/sum(rr,indic(rr,"indus")); 
 
*  Consumptino demand levels are assumed proportional to 
*  expenditure per capita times population: 
 
cd.l(r) = indic(r,"exppc")*indic(r,"pop") / 
 sum(rr,indic(rr,"exppc")*indic(rr,"pop")); 
 
*  Investment shares are likewise based on indicator data: 
 
id.l(r) = indic(r,"invest")/sum(rr, indic(rr,"invest")); 
 
*  Government demand is assumed proportional to GRP: 
 
gd.l(r) = indic(r,"grp")/sum(rr, indic(rr,"grp")); 
 
Here, then, is the system of linear equations which determine service sector supplies -- note that 
these equations are defined in terms of submatrices taken from the national input-output table, 
hence we retain the input-output characteristics from the national table when setting up the 
regional statistics, and we only calibrate regional shares of output: 
 
positive 
variable  a(g,r)  Armington activity level; 
 
equations  pamkt, pdmkt, pmmkt; 
 
*  Armington composite goods supply and demand: 
 
pamkt(g,r)$(a.lo(g,r) ne a.up(g,r)).. 
 
  a(g,r) * a0_(g) =e= sum(gg, id0_(g,gg)*y(gg,r))  
    + ac0_(g)*cd.l(r) + ai0_(g)*id.l(r) + ag0_(g)*gd.l(r); 
   83
*  Market for domestic supply: 
 
pdmkt(g,r)$(y.lo(g,r) ne y.up(g,r)).. 
 
  (d0_(g)+s0_(g))*y(g,r) =e=  




*  Market for imported supply: 
 
pmmkt(mrg,g,r)$(rtm.lo(mrg,g,r) ne rtm.up(mrg,g,r)).. 
  rtm(mrg,g,r) * rtm0_(mrg,g) =e= 
    sum(gg, y(gg,r) * md0_(mrg,g,gg)) 
     + y(g,r)  * ei.l(r,g) * md0_(mrg,g,"x") 
  +  cd.l(r)*md0_(mrg,g,"c") 
  +  id.l(r)*md0_(mrg,g,"i") 
  +  gd.l(r)*md0_(mrg,g,"g"); 
 
After having constructed input-output tables, we then integrate and rebalance trade statistics to 
match these production and consumption statistics. 
 
 